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COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES IN DISTRICT COURT
The caption of the case contains a complete list of all parties to the case in
the district court.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2(3)0).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Do licensed adoption agencies have standing to obtain a judicial

determination of the applicability of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children
(the "ICPC") to situations where the agencies bring expectant mothers to Utah prior to
delivery and placement of their children for adoption, if the agencies were ordered by the
state defendants to comply with the ICPC in such situations, failure to comply with the
ICPC can result in licensing violations up to and including revocation of their license,
and compliance with the state's interpretation could negatively affect their business?
This issue was raised by way of the state defendants' motion to dismiss for
lack of standing. R. 23-56.
This question turns primarily on whether appellants presented a justiciable
controversy under the Declaratory Judgment Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-33-1 and
78-33-2. Whether appellants stated a justiciable controversy under the Declaratory
Judgment Act is a question of law reviewed for correctness. See Salt Lake County
Comm yn v. Short, 1999 UT 73, 985 P.2d 899. Plaintiffs note that the district court
dismissed their complaint based on an entirely different issue concerning standing that is
not applicable to their request for a judicial construction of the ICPC.

1

2.

Does the ICPC apply to the movement of an unborn child across

state lines where the ICPC expressly applies to the "placement" of a "child," and the term
"child" is defined as "a person who, by reason of minority, is legally subject to parental,
guardianship, or similar control"?
This question was raised in the district court in plaintiffs' motion for partial
summary judgment. R. 178-232.
Interpretation of statutory language is a question of law reviewed for
correctness. Bearden v. Croft, 2001 UT 76, f 5, 31 P.3d 637, 538.
While the district court did not interpret the statute because it dismissed the
complaint for lack of standing, this Court "may pass upon and determine all questions of
law involved in the case presented upon the appeal and necessary to the final
determination of the case." Utah R. App. P. 30(a). See also State v. James, 819 P.2d
781, 795 (Utah 1991) ("Issues that are fully briefed on appeal and are likely to be
presented on remand should be addressed by this court.").
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1, Jurisdiction of district courts — Form -- Effect.
The district courts within their respective jurisdictions
shall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal
relations, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.
No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the
ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for.
The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form
and effect; and such declaration shall have the force and
effect of a final judgment or decree.
2

Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-2. Rights, status, legal relations under instruments or
statutes may be determined.
Any person interested under a deed, will or written
contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are
affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or
franchise, may have determined any question of construction
or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance,
contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status
or other legal relations thereunder.
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-701. Interstate Compact on Placement of Children —
Text.

ARTICLE II Definitions
As used in this compact:
(1) "Child" means a person who, by reason of minority, is
legally subject to parental, guardianship, or similar control.
(2) "Sending agency" means a party state, officer, or
employee thereof; a subdivision of a party state, or officer or
employee thereof; a court of a party state; a person, corporation,
association, Indian tribe, charitable agency, or other entity which
sends, brings, or causes to be sent or brought any child to another
party state.
(3) "Receiving state" means the state to which a child is
sent, brought or caused to be sent or brought, whether by public
authorities or private persons or agencies, and whether for
placement with state or local public authorities or for placement
with private agencies or persons.
(4) "Placement" means the arrangement for the care of a
child in a family free, adoptive, or boarding home, or in a childcaring agency or institution but does not include any institution
caring for the mentally ill, mentally defective or epileptic or any
institution, primarily educational in character, and any hospital or
other medical facility.

3

ARTICLE III Conditions for Placement
(1) No sending agency shall send, bring, or cause to be sent
or brought into any other party state any child for placement in
foster care or as a preliminary to a possible adoption unless the
sending agency shall comply with each and every requirement set
forth in this article and with the applicable laws of the receiving
state governing the placement of children therein.
(2) Prior to sending, bringing, or causing any child to be
sent or brought into a receiving state for placement in foster care or
as a preliminary to a possible adoption, the sending agency shall
furnish the appropriate public authorities in the receiving state
written notice of the intention to send, bring, or place the child in
the receiving state. The notice shall contain:
(a) The name, date, and place of birth of the child.
(b) The identity and address or addresses of the parents or legal
guardian.
(c) The name and address of the person, agency, or institution to or
with which the sending agency proposes to send, bring, or place the
child.
(d) A full statement of the reasons for such proposed action and
evidence of the authority pursuant to which the placement is
proposed to be made.
(e) Any public officer or agency in a receiving agency state which
is in receipt of a notice pursuant to Paragraph (2) of this article may
request of the sending agency, or any other appropriate officer or
agency of or in the sending agency's state, and shall be entitled to
receive therefrom, such supporting or additional information as it
may deem necessary under the circumstances to carry out the
purpose and policy of this compact.
(f) The child shall not be sent, brought, or caused to be sent or
brought into the receiving state until the appropriate public
authorities in the receiving state shall notify the sending agency, in
writing, to the effect that the proposed placement does not appear
to be contrary to the interests of the child.

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in the
District Court.
This is a declaratory judgment action filed June 10, 2002, by three adoption

agencies after they were told by the Office of Licensing of the Utah Department of
Human Services to comply with the ICPC before bringing expectant birth mothers to
Utah to deliver their children and possibly place them for adoption.1 R. 1-12. The
agencies sought a declaration that, among other things, the ICPC does not apply to the
movement of unborn children across state lines, so compliance is not required for a nonresident expectant birth mother who plans to deliver her child in Utah and place it for
adoption. R. 6-7. The agencies also asserted the constitutional rights of expectant birth
mothers to travel to Utah to deliver their children, and sought a declaration that the
Office of Licensing's interpretation of the ICPC violated this right.2 R. 7-8.
Later, on September 3, 2002, the agencies added certain defendants
connected with the Association of Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the
Placement of Children (the "AAICPC"). R. 147-61. The state defendants based their
interpretation of the ICPC on a 1986 opinion by the Secretariat of the AAICPC.
1

Plaintiffs originally filed their case in federal court alleging the
constitutional right to travel belonging to birth mothers as the basis for federal
jurisdiction. The federal court, however, dismissed that action for lack of standing and
plaintiffs refiled in state court.
2

The Agencies do not raise this issue of the right to travel on appeal.
5

Defendant Michael Chapman sought advice and guidance from the AAICPC on issues
raised by this lawsuit, and on or about July 9, 2002, the AAICPC issued a seven-page
letter to Mr. Chapman reaffirming the 1986 opinion and providing guidance concerning
issues raised by plaintiffs. R. 124-34.
On July 1, 2002, the state defendants filed a motion to dismiss arguing that
the agencies did not present a justiciable controversy and that the agencies did not have
standing to raise the constitutional rights of the expectant birth mothers. R. 23-56. On
October 16, 2002, the adoption agencies filed a motion for partial summary judgment
arguing that the plain language of the ICPC did not apply to an unborn child that is
transported across state lines. R. 178-232. On October 17, 2002, the AAICPC
defendants filed a motion to dismiss joining in the state defendants' motion and also
arguing that because their Secretariat's opinions are not binding, the Agencies failed to
state a claim for relief against them. R. 238-52.
Following oral argument, on January 28, 2003, the district court issued a
minute entry granting the state defendants' motion to dismiss solely on the basis that
plaintiff agencies did not have standing to raise the constitutional rights of expectant
birth mothers. R. 359-62. The district court did not address whether the agencies had
standing on their own to obtain an interpretation of the ICPC. The district court signed a
final order on February 25, 2003, R. 363-69, and two of the plaintiff agencies filed a
notice of appeal on February 28, 2003. R. 370-72.
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Statement of Facts.
The ICPC is a uniform law that has been enacted by all 50 states, the

District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. R. 182.3 The ICPC establishes
procedures for the interstate placement of children and fixes responsibility for those
involved in placing the child. R. 182.
Each state appoints a Compact Administrator and one or more Deputy
Administrators who oversee or perform the day-to-day tasks associated with the
administration of the ICPC. R. 182. In Utah, the Compact Administrator's office is
located within the Division of Child and Family Services ("DCFS"), which is a division
of defendant Department of Human Services (the "Department"). The Department,
through the DCFS, is responsible for accepting and reviewing information submitted in
connection with placement of children across state lines pursuant to the ICPC. Utah
Code Ann. § 62A-4a-703. R. 182.
Plaintiffs are three adoption agencies licensed by the state of Utah;
Alternative Options and Services for Children, dba Act of Love ("Act of Love"),
Adoption Center of Choice, Inc. ("Adoption Center"), and A TLC Adoption, Inc. Only

3

Many of the facts recited are as stated in support of Plaintiffs' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment. These facts were not disputed by defendants and, therefore,
are deemed admitted. R. 254, 297.
7

Act of Love and Adoption Center have taken this appeal.4 They will be referred to
collectively as the "Agencies."
Defendant Michael Chapman ("Chapman") has been appointed as the
Deputy Compact Administrator for the State of Utah, and until recently he was also
president of the AAICPC. R. 182. Mr. Chapman has a bachelor's degree in social
science, but he does not have a Utah social work license. R. 322. Defendant Robin
Arnold-Williams ("Arnold-Williams") is the Executive Director of the Department.
R. 183. Defendant Janice P. Knaphus ("Knaphus") is a Licensing Specialist in the Office
of Licensing of the Department with responsibilities for adoption agencies. R. 183.
Defendant Dennis Eshman is the Manager of the Secretariat Staff of the
AAICPC. R. 183. Defendant AAICPC is a national organization, the members of which
are the Compact Administrators and Deputy Compact Administrators of the various
states. R. 183. Defendant American Public Human Services Association ("APHSA") is
Secretariat of the AAICPC. R. 183.
As licensed child-placing agencies, the Agencies are charged by the State
of Utah with the responsibility to protect the best interests of the children who are
relinquished to them for adoption. R. 183. The Agencies are required to follow certain

4

That A TLC Adoption has chosen not to participate in the appeal should
not be taken as a sign that it does not believe in the merits of its arguments presented in
the district court. It has reasons, wholly separate from the merits of the case, for not
participating in this appeal.
8

regulations designed to protect children, birth parents, and adoptive parents in the
adoption process. See, e.g., Utah Admin. Code §§ R501-7-5.F; R501-7-8.B.3;
R501-7-5.A. R. 183.
A significant portion of the Agencies' business includes birth mothers who
choose, for personal and varied reasons, to come to Utah to deliver their children and
place them for adoption. R. 151. Prior to November 19, 2001, the state of Utah had not
required that the Agencies comply with the ICPC when bringing an expectant birth
mother to Utah from another state, although defendant Chapman had expressed the
opinion that it did apply. R. 152, 184.
The state defendants took the position commencing November 19, 2001,
that the ICPC must be complied with before an expectant mother travels to Utah to
deliver her child in Utah. R. 184. They base their interpretation in part on a
June 30, 1986 opinion issued by the Secretariat of the AAICPC, Secretariat Opinion #49
("Opinion #49"). R. 184.
Opinion #49 addresses the question of whether "a birth mother who comes
to State A from another state in order to give birth and then places her child with a State
A couple [can] thereby avoid application of [the] Interstate Compact on the Placement of
Children." R. 184,208-10. The opinion states:
Where the expectant mother crosses a state line
as part of the placement plan and arrangement,
the transaction should be viewed as an interstate
placement. In enacting the Compact the intent
9

of the state legislatures was not to make the
protections of placements depend on
mechanical manipulation of the delivery point.
Such logistic calculations are nothing more than
subterfuges and studied efforts to avoid the
inte[n]ded and normal consequences of the law.
R. 209.
On December 3, 2001, Knaphus sent a letter to each of the Agencies
informing them that as of November 19, 2001, the Office of Licensing and the
Department "have been directed... to utilize [Opinion #49] on all regulatory and
licensing actions concerning child placing agencies where expectant mothers residing in
another state travel to Utah to give birth and place their child for adoption." R. 184,
211-13.
This interpretation is problematic because the plain language of the ICPC
requires approval from the "receiving state" prior to a child entering that state. Utah
Code Ann. § 62A-4a-701, Article 111(2). To obtain such approval, notice must be given
to the receiving state containing information including the "name, date, and place of birth
of the child." Id., Article III(2)(a). Of course, if the child is not yet born, this
information cannot be supplied.
Yet, pursuant to the ICPC, a violation of its provisions can result in the
suspension or revocation of the Agencies' licenses as child-placing agencies. See Utah
Code Ann. § 62A-4a-701, Article IV. R. 184-85. Thus, the Agencies face not only
practical problems relating to how the ICPC is to be complied with where a child has not
10

yet been born, but also a very real threat of administrative action if they do not comply.
Indeed, on March 1, 2002, defendant Knaphus, on behalf of the Office of Licensing, sent
Adoption Center a "Corrective Action Plan for Non Compliance with Rules" because she
alleged Adoption Center violated the December 3, 2001 letter.5 R. 52-53.
On June 10, 2002, the Agencies brought a complaint in Third Judicial
District Court against the state defendants seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
R. 1-12. The Agencies asked in their complaint that the district court declare that the
ICPC did not apply to unborn children and that requiring ICPC compliance for an
expectant birth mother violated the birth mother's constitutional right to travel. R. 6-8.
After this litigation was commenced, defendant Chapman sought guidance
from the AAICPC concerning the application of the ICPC to expectant birth mothers
who travel interstate. The AAICPC responded with a seven-page letter detailing its
continued adherence to Opinion #49, opining about this specific lawsuit, and offering
support, assistance, and guidance. R. 124-34.
Because of this involvement by the AAICPC, the Agencies filed a second
amended complaint on September 3, 2002, naming the AAICPC, its president at the time
(who was defendant Chapman), its staff manager Dennis Eshman, and the entity

5

The state later withdrew this Corrective Action Plan pending the outcome
of this litigation.
11

identified as its Secretariat, the APHSA. R. 147-61. Collectively, these defendants were
known in the district court as the Association defendants.
On July 1, 2002, the state defendants filed a motion to dismiss arguing that
the Agencies had not stated a justiciable controversy under the Declaratory Judgment Act
and that they lacked standing to raise the constitutional rights of the birth mothers.
R. 23-56. On October 17, 2002, the Association defendants filed a motion to dismiss of
their own and joined in the state's motion. The Association defendants argued that the
Agencies did not state a claim for relief against them because Opinion #49 is not binding
on the state. R. 238-52.
On October 16, 2002, the Agencies filed a motion for partial summary
judgment asking the district court to declare that the ICPC could not be interpreted to
apply to unborn children brought into Utah by their expectant mothers. R. 178-232. The
Agencies did not raise the issue of the birth mother's right to travel in their motion.
Following oral argument, on February 25, 2003, the district court granted
the state defendants' motion to dismiss solely on the basis that the Agencies purportedly
do not have standing to raise the constitutional rights of birth mothers. R. 363-69. The
district court concluded as follows:
3. In this case, plaintiffs lack standing because they
fail to request relief for an alleged violation of their own
constitutional rights. Instead, plaintiffs predicate their entire
allegations on the alleged violation of the rights of non-party
expectant mothers.

12

4. Plaintiffs may, under certain circumstances, have
standing to assert the rights of a third party. In order to do so,
plaintiffs must show: "first, the presence of some substantial
relationship between the claimant and the third parties;
second the impossibility of the right holders asserting their
own constitutional rights; and third, the need to avoid a
dilution of third parties' constitutional rights." Shelledv, 836
P.2dat789.
5. Plaintiffs lack the ability to assert third party rights
of expectant mothers because plaintiffs'relationship with
third party expectant mothers is not "substantial," the third
party mothers are capable of asserting their own
constitutional rights, and there is nothing to indicate that
failure to permit third party standing will somehow dilute the
expectant mothers' constitutional rights. This conclusion is
inextricably linked with defendants' arguments on
declaratory judgment.
R.367.
The district court did not consider whether the Agencies had standing on
their own to challenge the state's or the AAICPC's interpretation of the ICPC, which is a
request for declaratory judgment the Agencies made separate from the issue of the impact
on a birth mother's right to travel. R. 367.
The district court also denied the Agencies' motion for partial summary
judgment, and it dismissed the Agencies' complaint without prejudice. R. 368.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Agencies have standing on their own, without looking to the rights of
expectant birth mothers, to obtain a judicial declaration of the application of the ICPC to
unborn children. The district court apparently did not see that this is a wholly separate
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issue that did not depend upon the rights of the birth mothers and did not require
third-party standing. The Agencies have also stated a justiciable controversy sufficient to
allow for a judicial determination of the issue. They have been told to comply with the
ICPC when bringing expectant birth mothers to Utah, and they run the risk of licensing
violations if they do not. Yet, compliance with the ICPC in such circumstances could
also harm their business.
The plain language of the ICPC only applies to children already born, and
not to unborn children carried by expectant mothers. This Court and others have held
that the ordinary meaning of the word "child" means a child that has been born. Thus,
the ICPC is unambiguous and only applies to the "placement" of a "child" who is bom,
and it does not apply to an unborn child.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE AGENCIES HAVE STANDING ON THEIR OWN TO OBTAIN
A JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF THE APPLICABILITY OF THE
ICPC.
The district court dismissed the Agencies' complaint because it apparently

understood they were asserting only the rights of third-party expectant birth mothers.
That is not correct. The Agencies have standing on their own to obtain a judicial
declaration of the applicability of the ICPC because they were ordered by the state
defendants to comply when they bring an expectant birth mother to Utah, and they run
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the risk of licensing violations if they do not comply. This interpretation of the ICPC
also harms the Agencies' business.
For someone to have standing, the person must have a direct and personal
stake in the outcome of the litigation. Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1150 (Utah
1983). To have a direct, personal stake in the outcome means that there is a causal
relationship between the injury to the plaintiff, the governmental actions, and the relief
requested. Id. If a plaintiff is injured by government action, that person automatically
has a direct and personal stake in the outcome of the litigation. Id.
A substantial part of the Agencies' business involves bringing expectant
mothers to Utah, if the mothers so choose, to deliver their children and possibly place
them for adoption. Prior to November 19, 2001, the Agencies were not required to
comply with the ICPC when they brought expectant mothers to Utah. However, on
December 3, 2001, the Office of Licensing ordered all adoption agencies to comply with
the ICPC when bringing an expectant mother to Utah for delivery and possible placement
of the child for adoption. R. 211-13. Adoption agencies are required to comply with the
ICPC. Utah Admin. Code § R501-7-11 .A. Violation of the ICPC can result in the
suspension or revocation of an agency license. Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-701, Article
IV. Indeed, the Office of Licensing showed by its March 1, 2002 letter to the Adoption
Center that it was serious about enforcing the ICPC pursuant to the terms of the
December 3, 2001 letters. R. 52-53.
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Thus, the Agencies have a direct, personal stake in the outcome of the
litigation. The state defendants have improperly told them to comply with the ICPC in
circumstances where compliance is not required. If the Agencies are correct that the
ICPC does not apply in these circumstances, they will be freed from the ever-present
threat of licensing violations if they do not comply and they will be able to conduct their
business as they have in the past. Thus, the Agencies have standing on their own to
obtain a judicial declaration of the applicability of the ICPC.
II.

PLAINTIFFS HAVE STATED A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY.
While the district court did not rule on this issue, defendants argued in the

district court that plaintiffs had not stated a justiciable controversy. This is wrong. This
Court has stated the purpose of the declaratory judgment procedure as follows:
The purpose of the creation of the declaratory
judgment procedure was to avoid the difficulties of the
common-law rule that rights would not be adjudicated by a
court unless there had been a violation for which relief could
be granted; and to provide a means for resolving
uncertainties and controversies before trouble has
developed or harm has occurred, and in order to avoid
future litigation.
Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 570 P.2d 119, 120-21 (Utah 1977) (emphasis added).
Thus, to state a claim under the Declaratory Judgment Act,
there must be a genuine justiciable controversy in that (1) the
interests of the parties involved are adverse, (2) the party
seeking relief must have, or assert a bona fide claim, of a
legally protectable interest therein, and (3) the issues must be
ripe for judicial determination. That is, it must appear either
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that there is an actual controversy, or that there is a
substantial likelihood that one will develop so that the
adjudication will serve a useful purpose in resolving or
avoiding controversy or possible litigation.
Id. at 121 (emphasis added).
The Declaratory Judgment Act itself states that it "is to be liberally
construed and administered" "to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity
with respect to rights, status and other legal relations." Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-12. In
view of this command, this Court has written that "the court will be indulgent in
entertaining actions brought to achieve that objective; and more particularly so, where
there is a substantial public interest to be served by the settlement of such an issue."
Salt Lake County, 570 P.2d at 121 (emphasis added). Furthermore, § 78-33-12 "allow[s]
for a wide interpretation of what constitutes a 'justiciable controversy.'" Salt Lake
County Comm 'n v. Short, 1999 UT 73,t12, 985 P.2d 899, 903 (emphasis added).
With these principles in mind, the Declaratory Judgment Act allows an
action by "[a]ny person . . . whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a
statute,.. . contract or franchise, [to] have determined any question of construction or
validity arising under the . . . statute . . . contract or franchise and [to] obtain a declaration
of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder." Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-2. "A
contract may be construed either before or after there has been a breach thereof." Utah
Code Ann. § 78-33-3. Furthermore, "[w]hen declaratory relief is sought all persons shall
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be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the
declaration . . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-11.
Plaintiffs have stated a justiciable controversy that can be resolved by the
Court through the declaratory judgment process. They seek a declaration of their rights,
status or other legal relations under a statute. Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-2. They also
present an actual controversy, or the substantial likelihood that one will develop. Other
cases this Court has decided show clearly that a proper declaratory judgment claim exists
in this case.
In Salt Lake County, the county sought a declaratory judgment as to,
among other things, issues surrounding the city's right to unilaterally terminate the
county's water supply, which it purchased from the city, without notice or hearing. The
county claimed the city had threatened to unilaterally terminate service to the county
without notice or hearing. The city argued that because there had been no actual
termination or even decrease in water supplies, the county had suffered no damage or
disadvantage and, therefore, there was no controversy on which to base a declaratory
judgment action. 570 P.2d at 120.
This Court concluded that because of the county's dependency on city
water, and the great difficulty the county could face if its supplies were cut off, the
dispute was a proper subject of a declaratory judgment proceeding "to relieve uncertainty
and insecurity and to avoid possible controversy and harm" so that "those depending on
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such services, should have an authoritative adjudication as to what their rights are; and
equally important, what their rights are not." Id. at 121.
In Short, at issue was the parties' disagreement over the nature of the
attorney-client relationship between the county commission and county attorney, whether
the county commission could hire independent counsel, and whether the county could
make charitable contributions. The parties simply disagreed on the legal issues involved,
but there were no actual "live" circumstances where their differing opinions were to be
applied by the court. This Court, however, concluded that the controversy over the
powers of each office was sufficient to create a justiciable controversy. It wrote:
The record convincingly evidences the fact that these two
parties have continually contested the power each entity has
over the other and the nature of their legal relationship. The
dispute will continue to affect the public interest, and under
the Act it is proper to resolve these issues, so that both parties
can devote their full energies to the performance of their
respective duties.
1999 UT 73, f 13, 985 P.2d at 903.
In Parker v. Rampton, 28 Utah 2d 36, 497 P.2d 848 (1972), the plaintiffs
each desired to be sterilized. They sought a declaration that a certain statute, which
prohibited sterilization of a certain class of people, did not apply to them. None of them
had been sterilized, and none of them had been charged with violating the statute. Each
had been told by a lawyer that he or she may be guilty of violating the statute if they did
submit to voluntary sterilization, and each of their doctors refused to perform the
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procedure. 28 Utah 2d at 37,40,497 P.2d at 849, 851. In ruling that a justiciable
controversy had been pleaded, this Court wrote that "[a]s to declaratory judgment, the
very purpose of that statute was to provide a means for securing an adjudication without
the necessity of someone having to suffer damage or get into serious difficulty before
he could seek to have his rights determined in court." Id. at 41, 497 P.2d at 851-52
(emphasis added).
An actual controversy also exists in this case. Steps have been taken by the
state defendants to require the Agencies to comply with Opinion #49, yet the Agencies
were not required to comply with Opinion #49 before, and they dispute that Opinion #49
correctly states the law. On December 3, 2001, each plaintiff was told by letter that the
Office of Licensing and the Department "have been directed to utilize [Opinion #49] on
all regulatory and licensing actions concerning child placing agencies where expectant
mothers residing in another state travel to Utah to give birth and place their child for
adoption." R. 211-13. The Agencies do not want to comply with Opinion #49 because
they believe it incorrectly states the law, but pursuant to Article IV of the ICPC, plaintiffs
could have their licenses suspended or revoked for failure to follow the ICPC. Thus, a
real controversy exists over the applicability of the ICPC when a birth mother travels to
Utah to deliver her baby and place it for adoption, and a real threat exists that failure to
follow Opinion #49 could result in a loss of the Agencies' licenses.
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The courts do not need to sit idly by and wait for one of the Agencies to
lose its license before a judicial declaration of the applicability of the ICPC can be made.
As this Court said in Parker, "the very purpose of that statute was to provide a means for
securing an adjudication without the necessity of someone having to suffer damage or
get into serious difficulty before he could seek to have his rights determined in court."
28 Utah 2d at 41, 497 P.2d at 851-52 (emphasis added). Clearly, a justiciable
controversy exists in this case.
III.

THE ICPC DOES NOT APPLY TO THE MOVEMENT OF
UNBORN CHILDREN.
"When interpreting statutes, [the courts] determine the statute's meaning by

first looking to the statute's plain language, and give effect to the plain language unless
the language is ambiguous." Blackner v. State DepL ofTransp., 2002 UT 44, \ 12, 48
P.3d 949. "When language is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it
expresses, and no room is left for construction." Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy
Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick, 890 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1995) (citation omitted).
When determining whether an ambiguity exists, moreover, the Court is to
look at the "ordinary meaning of the terms," and if the ordinary meaning "results in an
application that is neither unreasonably confused, inoperable, nor in blatant contradiction
to the express purpose of the statute, it is not the duty of [the] Court to assess the wisdom
of the statutory scheme." West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982)
(emphasis added). Only if there is an ambiguity in a statute should the Court "look
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beyond the plain language to legislative history or policy considerations." Vigos v.
Mountainland Builders, Inc., 2000 UT 2, f 13, 993 P.2d 207.
Under the plain language of the ICPC, no placement comes within its reach
unless it includes the "placement" of a "child" across state lines. The ICPC only
regulates a placement when a "sending agency" "send[s], bring[s], or cause[s] to be sent
or brought into any other party state any child for placement...." Utah Code Ann.
§ 62A-4a-701, Article 111(1). The ICPC defines what must happen before such a
placement across state lines can occur, including the sending of a notice containing the
name, date, and place of birth of the child, and provides that "[t]he child shall not be
sent, brought, or caused to be sent or brought into the receiving state until the appropriate
public authorities in the receiving state shall notify the sending agency, in writing, to the
effect that the proposed placement does not appear to be contrary to the interests of the
child." Id., Article III(2)(a) and (f) (emphasis added). Thus, while the ICPC regulates
"placements" across state lines, it only regulates placements involving a "child" who
crosses state lines. As such, the definition of "child" is key.
The ICPC defines "child" as "a person who, by reason of minority, is
legally subject to parental, guardianship, or similar control." Id., Article 11(1). This
definition does not explicitly include an unborn child, so the issue is whether it should be
interpreted to include an unborn child. It should not.
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This Court in Alma Evans Trucking v. Roach , 714 P.2d 1147, 1148 (Utah
1986), wrote that the "ordinary and usual" meaning of the word "child" is "a child which
has been born." The United States Supreme Court, in Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575,
579, 580-81, 95 S. Ct. 1180, 1183, 1184-85, 43 L.Ed.2d 469 (1975), also wrote that the
"ordinary meaning" of the "word 'child' [] refer[s] to an individual already born, with an
existence separate from its mother." While these cases were not decided under the ICPC,
they were statutory construction cases where the courts had to look to the "ordinary
meaning" of the word "child" to ascertain the meanings of the statutes they were
construing, just as this Court must do.
Because the ordinary meaning of the word "child" in Utah and elsewhere is
"a child which has been born," Roach, 714 P.2d at 1148, the term "child" in the ICPC is
unambiguous. It only applies to a child who has been born, and even the ICPC does not
define it differently. This Court should so rule.
The only state appellate court to consider whether the ICPC applies when
an expectant mother crosses state lines to deliver her baby and place the child for
adoption was the Nebraska Supreme Court in Yopp v. Blatt, 467 N.W.2d 868 (Neb.
1991). In Yopp, the birth mother was from Iowa, and she went to Nebraska to deliver her
child and place it for adoption. The Nebraska Supreme Court concluded that the ICPC
did not apply because the child was born in Nebraska, not Iowa, and was placed for
adoption in Nebraska.
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[The] child was bom in Omaha, Nebraska.. .. The child
was never taken from [Nebraska] to . . . Iowa, the residence
of [the birth mother]. The fact that [the birth mother] is a
resident of Iowa is not determinative in this case. The
[ICPC] does not mandate that the residence of the mother
is considered the residence of the child. The child was
never a resident of Iowa and was not placed across state lines.
[The ICPC] is not applicable.
Yopp, 467 N.W.2d at 878 (emphasis added).
The Kansas Supreme Court construed the term "child" in its adoption
statute in In re Adoption of Vincent, 202 Kan. 663, 451 P.2d 173 (1969), and said it
carried the "plain, ordinary meaning—a living child who could be the subject of
measurable paternal attention." 202 Kan. at 666, 451 P.2d at 176. That court also wrote
that the term "child" is "customarily used to refer to an individual in being as
distinguished from one not yet bom, as a fetus which has no existence of its own apart
from its mother . . . . " Id. Based on this decision, the Kansas Attorney General issued an
opinion in 1988 concluding that the ICPC did not apply to an expectant mother who
traveled to Kansas to deliver her child and place for adoption. Kan. Atty. Gen. Op.
No. 88-174 (December 28, 1988). R. 229-32.
Similarly, in State of Florida, Department of Health & Rehabilitative
Services v. Friends of Children, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 1221 (N.D. Fla. 1986), a Florida
statute prohibited a birth mother from taking or sending her "child" out of state for
purposes of adoption. The statute defined "child" as "a son or daughter, whether by birth
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or adoption." 653 F. Supp. at 1226. The court interpreted this language as not applying
to a fetus since it did not expressly include a fetus. Id.
Policy considerations also support the Agencies' position. When a birth
mother travels to Utah to deliver her baby and place it for adoption, the best interests of
the child are protected whether she places the child with an adoptive family in Utah or an
adoptive family residing elsewhere. If she places through one of the Agencies, the best
interests of the child will be protected because the Agencies are child-placing agencies
licensed by the state of Utah. As licensed child-placing agencies, they are required to
protect those interests. Utah Admin. Code § R501-7-1 O.C.I ("Adoption agency mission
statements, policies, and procedures shall assure that the . . . best interests of the child are
paramount." ). If they have failed in that responsibility, they would not continue to hold
their licenses. The Agencies must have certified or licensed clinical social workers on
staff to make placement decisions, unlike Mr. Chapman—the Utah ICPC decisionmaker,
who holds no Utah social work licenses. See Utah Admin. Code §§ R501-7-4.A.7.b,
R501-7-8.D, and R. 322. The interests of the child are protected to the same extent the
interests of a child born to a Utah birth mother would be protected by the Agencies, and
Mr. Chapman does not sign off on those adoptions.
If a birth mother comes to Utah to deliver and she places through one of the
Agencies with an out-of-state family for adoption, the Agencies would be required to
obtain ICPC approval for the placement from Utah to the other state, thereby again
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insuring the interests of the child are protected and that the receiving state has had a hand
in the placement. Either way, the laws of the state where the child will ultimately live,
and not where the birth mother comes from, will determine the appropriate level of
protection for the child. This is entirely consistent with the ICPC, which only requires
approval of the "receiving state." Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-701, Article III(2)(f). In
each case, the best interests of the child are protected.
In sum, the term "child" in the ICPC should not be interpreted to include an
unborn child. Because it does not include an unborn child, compliance with the ICPC is
not required when an expectant mother travels to Utah to deliver her child and place it
for adoption.

IV.

THIS COURT CAN ADDRESS THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE
ICPC PRIOR TO REMAND.
While the district court did not address the construction of the ICPC

because it dismissed the complaint for lack of standing, this Court can address the merits
of the Agencies' argument. This Court "may pass upon and determine all questions of
law involved in the case presented upon the appeal and necessary to the final
determination of the case." Utah R. App. P. 30(a). See also State v. James, 819 P.2d
781, 795 (Utah 1991) ("Issues that are fully briefed on appeal and are likely to be
presented on remand should be addressed by this court."). If the Court finds that the
Agencies have standing to challenge the State's and the AAICPC's construction of the
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ICPC, the Court should also rule on the legal question of the applicability of the ICPC to
the movement of an unborn child.
CONCLUSION
The Court should reverse the decision of the district court and find that the
Agencies have standing to obtain a judicial declaration concerning the applicability of
the ICPC when an expectant birth mother travels to Utah to deliver her baby. The Court
should also hold that the ICPC does not apply in such cases. The case should then be
remanded to the district court for further proceeding consistent with the requested
rulings.
DATED this 15th day of May, 2003
WOOD CRAPO LLC

Larry SXJenkms^^^/
Attorneys!^Plaintiffs
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY

ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS AND SERVICES
FOR CHILDREN, a Utah non-profit
corporation, dba ACT OF LOVE, ADOPTION
CENTER OF CHOICE, INC., a Utah
corporation, and A TLC ADOPTION, a Utah
corporation,

COMPLAINT FOR
DECLARATORY AND
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Plaintiffs,

MICHAEL CHAPMAN, in his official capacity
as Deputy Compact Administrator of the
Interstate Compact on Placement of Children;
ROBIN ARNOLD-WILLIAMS, in her official
capacity as Executive Director of the Utah
Department of Human Services; JANICE P.
KNAPHUS, in her official capacity as
Licensing Specialist in the Office of Licensing
of the Utah Department of Human Services;
and the UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN
SERVICES, a governmental department of the
State of Utah,
Defendants.
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Judge
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Plaintiffs Alternative Options and Services for Children, a Utah non-profit
corporation, dba Act of Love, Adoption Center of Choice, Inc., and A TLC Adoption, Inc. bring
this complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants Michael Chapman, in his
official capacity as Deputy Compact Administrator of the Interstate Compact on Placement of
Children, Robin ArnoId-Williams, in her official capacity as Executive Director of the Utah
Department of Human Services, Janice P. Knaphus, in her official capacity as a Licensing
Specialist in the Office of Licensing of the Utah Department of Human Services, and the Utah
Department of Human Services, a governmental department of the State of Utah, and complain
and allege as follows:
PARTIES, VENUE AND JURISDICTION
1.

Plaintiff Alternative Options and Services for Children, dba Act of Love

("Act of Love") is a Utah non-profit corporation and is a licensed child-placing agency in the
state of Utah.
2.

Plaintiff Adoption Center of Choice, Inc. ("Adoption Center"), is a Utah

corporation and is a licensed child-placing agency in the state of Utah.
3.

Plaintiff A TLC Adoption, Inc. ("TLC") is a Utah corporation and is a

licensed child-placing in the state of Utah.
4.

Defendant Michael Chapman ("Chapman") is an individual residing in the

state of Utah and, upon information and belief, has been appointed as the Deputy Compact
Administrator responsible for coordination of all activities under the Interstate Compact on
Placement of Children (Utah Code § 62A-4a-701, hereinafter "ICPC") for the state of Utah.
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5.

Defendant Robin Arnold-Williams ("Arnold-Williams") is an individual

residing in the state of Utah and is the Executive Director of the Utah Department of Human
Services, the department of Utah government responsible for activities under the ICPC.
6.

Defendant Janice P. Knaphus ("Knaphus") is an individual residing in the

state of Utah and is a Licensing Specialist in the Office of Licensing of the Utah Department of
Human Services with oversight responsibilities for adoption agencies.
7.

Defendant Utah Department of Human Services (the "Department"), is the

department, through its Division of Child and Family Services, responsible for accepting and
reviewing information submitted in connection with placement of children across state lines
pursuant to the ICPC, and is also responsible, through its Office of Licensing, for licensing
adoption agencies.
8.

This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

9.

Utah's Declaratory Judgment statute, Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-3-4(1).

§ 78-33-1, also grants this Court the "power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations."
Moreover, "[a]ny person . . . whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a
statute . . . may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the . . .
statute .. . and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder." Utah
Code Ann. § 78-33-2.
10.

Venue is proper in this district pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-7.
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COMMON ALLEGATIONS
11.

The ICPC is uniform legislation in force in all 50 states. It requires

agencies, entities, and persons seeking to place children across state lines to obtain prior approval
for placements. The approval process requires the party placing the child to give notice of the
placement to the ICPC administrator and other appropriate public authorities. An evaluation of
the suitability of the placement is performed to determine if it is in the best interest of the child to
approve the placement.
12.

As licensed child-placing agencies, plaintiffs are charged by the state of

Utah with the responsibility to protect the best interests of the children who are relinquished to
them for adoption. Plaintiffs are required to follow certain regulations designed to protect the
children, the birth parents, and adoptive parents in the adoption process. Thus, plaintiffs are
charged with protecting the same interests the ICPC seeks to protect.
13.

Plaintiffs are often contacted by expectant mothers outside of the state

who are contemplating placing their expected children for adoption.
14.

Sometimes, to facilitate the adoption process, these non-resident expectant

mothers travel to Utah to obtain pre-natal services and care necessary to deliver the child safely.
15.

The children are then delivered in Utah facilities and may be placed for

adoption through plaintiffs' agencies, although each birth mother retains the right to keep her
baby until she actually signs a relinquishment or consent to adoption, which cannot occur until at
least 24 hours after 1he baby is born.
16.

A substantial part of plaintiffs' businesses involve expectant birth mothers

who travel to Utah to deliver their babies and to place them for adoption.
4

17.

Defendants have taken the position that the ICPC must be complied with

for an expectant mother to travel to Utah to deliver her child in Utah.
18.

Defendants takes their interpretation from a June 30, 1986 opinion issued

by the Secretariat of the Association of Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the
Placement of Children, Secretariat Opinion #49 ("Opinion #49").
19.

Opinion #49 does not have the force of law and has not been adopted as

the law in Utah.
20-

In 2000, Knaphus, on behalf of the Office of Licensing and at Chapman's

instruction, cited Act of Love for a licensing violation for failing to obtain prior approval before
an expectant mother was brought into the state of Utah to deliver her child. The Office of
Licensing withdrew the violation after Act of Love questioned the application of the ICPC to the
situation.
21.

On November 21, 2001, an attorney for the Department of Human

Services wrote to an attorney for Act of Love that "the Office of Licensing has been instructed,
as of November 19, 2001, to enforce those [ICPC] requirements with regard to all licensed child
placing agencies." This language referred to requiring agencies to obtain ICPC approval when
helping an expectant birth mother travel to Utah.
22.

This letter resulted from guidance received by Arnold-Williams from an

assistant Utah Attorney General recommending that the Department use Opinion #49 "as
guidance for the department's regulatory actions, specifically for the Office of Licensing and the
Division of Child and Family Services."
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23.

Similarly, on December 3,2001, Knaphus sent a letter to each plaintiff

informing them that as of November 19, 2001, the Office of Licensing and the Department "have
been directed to utilize [Opinion #49] on all regulatory and licensing actions concerning child
placing agencies where expectant mothers residing in another state travel to Utah to give birth
and place their child for adoption."
24.

Pursuant to the ICPC, a violation of its provisions can result in the

suspension or revocation of plaintiffs' licenses as child-placing agencies.
25.

Shortly after receiving the December 3, 2001 letter, plaintiffs filed suit in

federal court challenging the interpretation of the ICPC found in Opinion #49. That action was
dismissed without prejudice by the federal court on jurisdictional grounds.
26.

On March 1, 2002, during the pendency of the federal action, Knaphus

sent a corrective action plan and a finding of a licensing violation to Adoption Center of Choice
for violating the December 3, 2001 letter, even though defendants had stipulated to an injunction
against enforcement while the case was pending.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Declaratory Judgment)
27.

Plaintiffs restate and reallege all preceding paragraphs and incorporate the

same here by this reference.
28.

The ICPC applies only when a "child" from another state is brought or

sent to any other state for placement in foster care or preliminarily for a possible adoption.
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29.

The ICPC defines "child" as "a person who, by reason of minority, is

legally subject to parental, guardianship, or similar control." ICPC, Article 11(1). The definition
of "child" in the ICPC does not include a fetus or an unborn child.
30.

The ICPC further requires the party placing a child across state lines to

give notice, containing, among other things, the name, date, and place of birth of the child, and
the identity and address or addresses of the parents or legal guardian. ICPC, Article 111(2).
31.

When an expectant mother travels to Utah, the "child" to be placed for

adoption is not "brought" or "sent" under the ICPC, and the child never becomes a resident of
another state. Rather, the child is born in and is a resident of Utah. The child is, therefore, not
brought to Utah across state lines and the ICPC does not apply.
32.

Indeed, until the child is relinquished to one of plaintiffs' agencies, the

child is not subject to placement and remains in the legal custody and control of the birth mother.
33.

Furthermore, Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-15.1 provides that the ICPC only

must be complied with in an adoption proceeding when the child is born out of state.
34.

Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration from this Court finding that the

ICPC does not apply to situations where an expectant mother travels to Utah and delivers a child
here.
35.

The interpretation of the ICPC made by Opinion #49 and adopted by

defendants also infringes on the right of an expectant mother contemplating adoption to travel
interstate. The interpretation imposes a penalty on expectant mothers traveling state to state by
requiring compliance with the ICPC when the expectant mother desires to travel to another state
to deliver her child and to place it for adoption.
7

36.

Expectant mothers from Utah do not have to go through these same ICPC

approval procedures to place their children with plaintiffs's agencies.
37.

Because Opinion #49fs interpretation of the ICPC and the consequent

requirements defendants have imposed upon plaintiffs impair expectant mothers' constitutional
rights to travel, the interpretation should be declared unconstitutional, and defendants, and those
acting in concert with them, should be enjoined from enforcing the interpretation.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Injunctive Relief)
38.

Plaintiffs restate and reallege all preceding paragraphs and incorporate the

same here by this reference.
39.

Opinion #49's interpretation of the ICPC is contrary to the language of the

ICPC and Utah law.
40.

This interpretation is being enforced by defendants through requirements

placed upon licensed child-placing agencies such as plaintiffs, and plaintiffs have been told they
must comply with the interpretation effective November 19, 2001.
41.

A significant part of plaintiffs' businesses involve non-resident, expectant

birth mothers who deliver their babies in Utah for adoption.
42.

Plaintiffs will be irreparably harmed if Opinion #49 is enforced against

43.

Plaintiffs have no adequate legal remedy and must resort to the equitable

them.

remedy of injunctive relief.

8

44.

Defendants, and all those acting in concert with defendants, should be

enjoined, preliminarily and permanently, from enforcing Opinion #49 and their unconstitutional
and invalid interpretation of the ICPC.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs prays for the following relief:
a.

For a declaration that the ICPC does not apply when an expectant mother

travels to Utah to give birth in Utah and/or for a declaration that defendants' interpretation
violates an expectant birth mother's right to travel.
b.

For preliminary and permanent injunctive relief against defendants, and all

those acting in concert with them,fromenforcing Opinion #49.
c.

For attorney fees and costs of this action as may be allowed by law.

d.

For such other and further relief as this Court deems just and equitable.

DATED this (0 day of June, 2002
WOOD CRAPO LLC

LarrylS. J^nkimJ
Attorneys forrlaintiffs
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Plaintiffs' Addresses:
Act of Love
9561 South 700 East, Suite 101
Sandy, Utah 84070
Adoption Center of Choice, Inc.
241 West 520 North
Orem, Utah 84057
A TLC Adoption
316 West 850 South
Layton, Utah 84041
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State of Utah
Michael 0. Leavitt
Governor

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES
OFFICE OF LICENSING

Robin Arnold-Wiibmas
MarkE Ward
fl«0Uty Dir*»csnr

RfitaO Oram
Du-«ctor

120 Noah 200 West. Suilo 303
P.O Box 45500

Salt take City, Utah 84145-0500
(801)S3S-4242

an equal opportunity employer

March 1,2002

James C. Webb, Executive Director and
Karyn Takke, Director of Social Work
The Adoption Center of Choice
241 West 520 North
Orem,UT 84057
RE:

Corrective Action Plan for Non Compliance with Rules
Child Placing Adoption Agency License # 5889
Complaint #0123.02

Dear Mr. Webb and Ms. Takke:
Based upon the results of a complaint investigation, the following Corrective Action Plan has
been prepared. This is done in accordance with Rule 501-1-5 Corrective Action Plan for Non
Compliance with Rides. These requirements are based upon the following Rule that was the
subject of the complaint:
R501-7-11.A. For interstate placements, adoption agencies shall comply with
requirements of the Interstate Compact for Placement of Children. The agency's attorney
advised the agency that since the child was bom in Utah, ICPC would not apply, per UCA §7830-15-1 Compliance with the Interstate Compact on Placement of Children- In any adoption
proceeding the petition for adoption shall state whether the child was born in another state and,
if so, both the petition and the court's final decree of adoption shall state that the requirements
of Title 62A. Chapter 4a, Part 7, Interstate Compact on Placement of Children, have been
complied with. On December 3,2001, the Office of Licensing notified all licensed child placing
adoption agencies regarding the applicability of the ICPC to child placing agencies when
expectant mothers travel to Utah to give birth and place their children for adoption. The birth
mother in question is clearly not a resident of Utah She came to Utah, gave birth to the child on
August 6,2001, then returned to North Carolina with the child. She later decided to proceed
with her adoption plan and the agency brought her to Utah to relinquish custody. It appears that
the birth mother was transported to Utah in order to bypass ICPC procedures. Substantiated
violation of Rule.

Agency Action Required
By March 8, 2002, the agency will complete and submit through the appropriate channels
ICPC Form 100 A for approval of the placement of Kenneth Skylar Baker, AKA Franklin
Edward Osborne HI, dob 8/6/01, with a courtesy copy to the Office of Licensing. Furtliermore,
in all cases in which the agency transports birth parents lo Utah from another state the agency
will conform to ICPC procedures.
Measurement of Success ~ Summary of Consequences
If the agency refuses to conform to ICPC procedures the agency license will be placed on
Conditional status.
Please sign this plan on the lines provided and return it to this office within five working
days. A second copy of the plan is enclosed for your records. If you have any questions, please
do not hesitate to call me at (801) 538-8222.
Sincerely,

fil^Afif^
Janice P> Knaphus
Licensing Specialist

James C. Webb, Executive Director

Date

Karyn Takkc, Director of Social Work

Date

Enclosure
cc:

Complainant
Reta Oram, Director
Office of Licensing
Alan Hayward, Supervisor
Office of Licensing
Carol Verdom, Assistant Attorney General
Attorney General's Office

Mike Chapman, ICPC
JPK/add
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CRAIG L. BARLOW (#0213)
JOELA.FERRE(#7517)
Assistant Attorneys General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (#4666)
Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendants
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
P.O. Box 140857
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857
Telephone: (801) 366-0353

ncpTJTY CLERK

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY

ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS AND SERVICES
FOR CHILDREN, a Utah non-profit corporation,
dba ACT OF LOVE, ADOPTION CENTER OF
CHOICE, INC., a Utah corporation, and A TLC
ADOPTION, a Utah corporation,
Plaintiffs,

MOTION TO DISMISS

vs.
MICHAEL CHAPMAN, in his official capacity
as Deputy Compact Administrator of the
Interstate Compact on Placement of Children;
ROBIN ARNOLD-WILLIAMS, in her official
capacity as Executive Director of the Utah
Department of Human Services; JANICE P.
KNAPHUS, in her official capacity as Licensing
Specialist in the Office of Licensing of the Utah
Department of Human Services; and the UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, a
governmental department of the State of Utah,
Defendants.

Civil No. 020905025
Judge Stephen L. Henriod

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

Defendants, by and through their attorneys Craig L. Barlow and Joel A. Ferre, Assistant
Attorneys General, move the Court to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) & (6). Plaintiffs request a declaratory judgment on an interpretation of the Interstate Compact
on the Placement of Children (the "ICPC"), Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-701 (2002). The Court lacks
jurisdiction over the Complaint, however, because plaintiffs cannot maintain standing. Specifically,
plaintiffs improperly attempt to assert the rights of non-party expectant mothers and plaintiffs
themselves have not suffered any injury-in-fact because of defendants' conduct. This motion is further
supported by a Memorandum.
DATED this f^_

day of July, 2002.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

IG L. BARLOW
A. FERRE
Assistant Attorneys General

ii

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was
mailed, postage prepaid, this

day of July, 2002, to:

Wood Crapo, LLC
Larry S. Jenkins
G. Troy Parkinson
500 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Secretary
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PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE
OFFICE OF CHILDREN. YOUTH & FAMILIES
Hillcrest Bldg, #53,2nd Floor, P.O. Box 2675, Hanisburg, PA 17106-2675
FAX COVER PAGE

Eaifc

^•ANMOlZ
FAX NUMBER:

§UBjESIi
COMMENTS:

ftq

33twg95

%/tfo*Jo.

NUMBER OF PAGES:

CfUVtW 99
/ iooukP typicr you 7i) 3ncuJ

^(ADVULC OF CcWftl/WtL

Mlti^,YitWD

Comt dftMQ// </_9

IfyttLSr^ZU)

P*Q6cyW}*xt//

FROM:

l

I
Division of State Services
Telephone: 717/772-7016
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Interstate Compact Unit
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American Public Human Services Association
Association of Administrators of tha Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children

July 9,2002
Mike Chapman
Deputy Compact Administrator, ICPC
Division of Children, Youth, and Families
120 North 200 West, Suite 225
Sail Lake City, Utah 84103
Dear Mike:
You have requested an analysis of a case involving a Utah child p'acing agency, a
Pennsylvania binhmother, and an effort to place the chilifromUiah (o Colorado. This
letter contains such an analysis and (he views of the Secretariat to tfie Asawciarion of
Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Chjldrun.
FACTS, A Pennsylvania binhmother relinquished her child to a Utah child-placing
agency (hereafter referred to as "Agency"). She did so while she was in Utah, This was
done without using the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children OCCPC). The
Agency then submitted a Form 100A (Request for Placement) pi rsuant tn ICPC
requesting placement of the cbild with Colorado prospective adoptive parents. The Form
100A was submitted through the Utah Compact Administrator b it sent by Colorado to
Pennsylvania in the belief that Pennsylvania is the appropriate o ipnatixig state for mis
placement transaerion. Eennsylvania requires that, one o( its. fonns providing information
&^brnpleted bytt\e birthxaother, but she refases to do so.
/ UU£L( u c r ^
Earlier, the Agency commenced suit in a federal coun against the Utah Oepury Compact
Administrator, the head of (he Utah Human Services Departme'it and an official of the
Utah licensing unit. The suit asked a declaratory judgment thai ICPC does not apply to
cases in which a binhmother comes to Utahfromanother jurisdiction to surrender her
child for adoption, gives birth h Utah and then places her chiH w,th a Utah Agency.
Secretariat Opinion #49 of the Association of Administrators rf die Interstate Compact
on the Placement of Children takes die position that ICPC does apply 10 such cases, and
the Utah Department notified that Agency that it would enforce the position taken in
Secretariat Opinion #49.
The Federal Court wsued a temporary injunction requiring the Utah Compact
Administrator not to enforce ICPC i& such cases against me /tgency. The injunction was
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to remain in effect during the pendency of the suit. Approximately three months
thereafter, the Federal Court dismissed the suit- The relinquishment by the Pennsylvania
birthmother took place during the period when the temporary injunction was in effect. It
is expected that the JJtah Agency will take theposttibn thai it is not r^uired ro follow
ICPC in this case because the birthmother came to Utah and surrendvTOcl her vhild while
the injunction was in effect Further, the Agency has now filed suit i n a Utah state court
making the same claims and asking the same relief that it did in the federal cuurt action:
Le., that ICPC does not apply ro birthraothers who come to Utah, thsu njive birth and
relinquish the child to a Utah Agency.
In maldng the prcjsept analysis it will be necessary to make some reft rcfice to the position
taken in Secretariat Opinion #49, but primary attention will be focus**] en the facts of the
particular ease which you have now asked us to analyse. You alread / have in your
possession other materials supplied by the Secretariat relating to the issue of binhmothers
who cross state lines, give birth and then relinquish their newly bom in£ux&
ANALYSIS. A firs: vexing question is what significance should be attached to the
temporary injunction issued by the federal court during the proceeding pending b<fOfe it.
The defendant stipulated to the injunction, but that does not fully explain its proper scope.
If the case in the federal court had involved the interpretation and enforcement of an
ordinary state law, and if all affected parties w«n* within the State of Utah, it aught have
been reasonable to apply the injunction to any acts which theplainiif *ioight perform in
obeying or disregarding ICPC. However, ICPC is an interstate compact Ii govern* the
activities, rights and obligations of persons, srates and their subdivisions in p:«rtieipaiing
in placement of children between and among the states. In the case the facts of which are
presented above, a Pennsylvania birthmother was involved. Also, the administration of
the Compact by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, as well as by t) a State of Utah, was
and is involved. Similarly, if applied to other instances of birthmothitfs coining, to Utah
to relinquish their children to the Agency, the interests of birthmother, .states,
prospective adoptive parents in states other than Utfah Would be affected. Neither the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania nor the Pennsylvania birthmother were parties to the
federal suit brought by the Agency and in which the temporary injunction wis issued.
Also, neither the State of Colorado nor the Colorado prospective adooiivc parents wctc
parties to thai suit.
Another curious feature of the injunction is that it appear* to havehtttt issued before the
federal court determined that it had jurisdiction over the case. In fac „ the federal court
subsequently dismissed the suit on jurisdictional grounds. Since the federal i;oun found
that it did not have jurisdiction (or Would not exercise it), the validity uf the injunction is
open to question.
It is possible to interpret the injunction (to which the State of Utah striated) as an
undertaking not to take licensing action against the Agency during tta ilxne when the
injunction was in effect. If this intetpretation is applied, it should bv considered that the
Agency could not have ICPC eqfor<«d against it by a licensing pmc fading for bringing
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the Pennsylvania birthmother 10 Utah and accepting a relinquishment without complying
with ICPC
In any eyem;, the temporary injunction cannot be said to have been in force ffrr more Than
a periodending with the dismissal of the federal suit It was DOT in fcrcc when the
Agency submitted on ICPC-100A to the Utah Compact Office for transmittal to
Colorado, nor could ii possibly be binding on the State of Colorado or the Srste of

Pennsylvania as (hey seek to pursue tbeir administration of ICPC.
At best, wc can say that Utah could not suspend or revoke the Agenc y's cHiki-placing
license for having accepted a relinquishment from the Pennsylvania liirthrooMier
Whether the facts support the proposition that the Agency (by the re] oqaishmatf)
acquired a right to place the child-—arightwhich Colorado or Pennsylvania fttust
recognize—is a different question.
Arricie ID of ICPC requires that a sending agency provide the state into whicft it proposes
to make a placement with a statement showing that it has authority tcra;*kethe proposed
placement. Colorado sppareurly determined that the relinquishment A/as insufficient to
confer such authority on the Agency because the placement of the child with the Utah
Agency was made without using ICPC. It sent the Request for Place neat (ICPC-100A)
to Fen&sylvania. That ante has demanded ttal die birthmother sign t form and provide
infotmation before it will begin an ICPC procedure to have die child placed in another
Stale (presumably either Utah or Colorado), feoth Pennsylvania and Colorado take the
position that cases in which birthmothers go to a receiving state to & /c birth ynd
relinquish the child to an agency in the receiving state are instances t > *bicb the
Compact applies.
A suit in a Utah State court is not an appropriate means for contesting rhe action of
Colorado of Pennsylvania. Obviously, neither of those states is subject to thu jurisdiction
of a Utah court. This would be true even if the suit recently begun m a Utah court
contesting the applicability of ICPC to cases such as the present one tiitf already been
decided in favor of Ate Agency. However, the federal suit making si tular allegations was
dismissed and the Utah ease has only just begun.
We are told that the plaintiffs may include the alleged grievance con<;cming ihe
Pennsylvaniabirthmother and her child in the pending state coun suit. The complaint
fUrnished to us a week ago does not do so. It merely contends that Secretariat Opinion
#49, holding that expectant mothers and persons in receiving states who make
arrangements to have them come to the receiving slate, deliver a chi<d there, and then
surrender it for adoption, is inapplicable io such persons. However, fee presume that the
plaintiffs could add the Pennsylvania birthmother episode to their cr hip I aim
In any event, there is a practical question which should be addressee by the Utah
Department, the Agency, and any others involved with the welfare c f the child. What is
to become of thai child? We are not told who is caring for the child flow. But whatever
the present Arrangement! it must contain legal uncertainties. The pmpcr objective should
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be TO obtain a permanent placement for the child, which will satisfy is need-?—most
likely adoption.
By filing an ICPC-100A with che Utah Deputy Carapace Adnzinistra or prop vising
placement of the child with a Colorado couple, the Agency has asserted that it has
custody sufficient to pLace the child. Whether this is a correct position depends on one's
view of the temporary injunction issued by the federal court and nov no lender in affect.
We have suggested that ir might be interpreted only to have given ih; Agency immunity
from adverse action an its license during the lime when the injunction was in force.
However, that might be unduly harsh so far as the Pennsylvania birctaK'ther and her child
are concerned, The Agency and the other parties then inv&Ned may in flood faith have
believed that no adverse acrion would be taken against the Agency o * ihe hinhmother and
the child by giving the child into the custody of the Agency while thi? injunction was in <
effect. Since the course of events may have produced uncertainty as To vhe precise effect
of the injunction, the best course might be to seek adoption of die ch Id by a Utah couple
and not to raise any further questions with regard to that particular e; so.
The Pennsylvania hinhmother situation is typical of one kind of effb -t to ev&de ICPC.
Some attorneys and agenciesfrequentlyarrange with expectant mothers to come from
their home suites to the state of the anomey or agency, or to some oclier jurisdiction
where they have found couples who wish to adopt a child. The birth no:her delivers her
child in the state to which she has been brought and surrenders the if fane, either to the
agency or directly to the prospective adoptive parents. The position Alcon by the attorney
or agency is that the binh and the placement have taken place wixhin die sam* state. The
placement is thus claimed to be intrastate in character and ICPC themfere does not apply.
Article U (d) of the Compact, defining 'placement'* as the "arrangement for [tie care of a
child/1 is ignored. The Act that in almost all of such cases some or si) of the negotiations
for the transaction take place while the expectant mother is still in her home *tate, or in
some state other than the one where physical custody of the child is to he trtiqsferred, is
also ignored. We are invited to look at the process as being nothing nore then the
mechanical transfer of an infant from one party to another in a single location. The
meaning of the entire transaction is not considered. The reasons why ihe stales have
entered into m interstate compact to protect children who are proposed to be placed in
states other than (hat of the original parent or custodian are also purpo.se ly o\ erlooked,
The efforts of the plaintifft in the case originally dismissed, by the fe la*l court and now
filed in a Utah court are relevant to a full understanding of the Pennsylvania birthmother
episode and *qy administrative action or litigation which may devekip from it As noted
at the beginning of this letter, the reason why mors attention has not bet-ji paid to die
litigation already commenced is that the Secretariat responded at an surlier time to a Utah
request concerning the likelihood of litigation. However, since we have now seen the
complaint in the case recently filed, a few comments on ir may be useful,
I, The Complaint asserts that Secretariat Opinion U*9 is nor law in Jtsh. Tuis is true.
Opinions of the Secretariat are issued to assist state officials and others with questions
concerning the Compact, its interpretation, administration and enforcement. They arc
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advisory opinions. But because of the experience and expertise of rhe Association and its
Secretariat, The Secretarial Opinions have achieved standing as autnontativ.* expositions
of the law on the points with which they deal It is submitted that :iecrettriat Opinion
#49 is a sound interpretation of the Compact and of (he reasons foi applying ICPC to ~
instances in which birthmothers come to other states in order to gi^e birth and then
surrender their children for adoption,
2. The Intersrate Compact on the Placement of Children is charac crizcd m the
Complaint as uniform legislation adopted by the states* This may be one ivay of saying
that all of the states have enacted the Compact in identical language &nd that, therefore, ii
is uniform legislation. However, the Compact is not a "Uniform 1 JLW'1 lika the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Acrt which may be modified by the
unilateral action of a stare to suit itself ICPC is an interstate compact, winch constitutes
a contract among the states, as well as a statute of each of them, because it is a contract
among the states, it is necessary that it means the same thing in e;ich sratc.
Prom the time of its first enactmentsfortyyears ago, it has been j;en<sratty understood that
ICPC does apply to binhmother cases in the manner explained by Secretariat Opinion
#49, The Compact Administrators so administer the Compact. U is a m\a of statutory
construction that settled administrative practice in interpreting ar d applying a law is to be
given great weight as to its meaning.
CONCLUSION, If ICPC were an ordinary statute with the satiK: conteav as the Compact,
and if it could be administered successfully without cooperation from other states, it
would be correct to apply ICPC to the type of binhmother case *li$cussed in this letter.
Article X of ICPC directs that the law be construed liberally to ufteetuafca its purposes.
Its purposes are to protect children placed across state lines and to jiroteet receiving states
from running too greatrisksthat children unsuitably placed intc * receiving stare such as
Utah will become public charges. To those ends, the law sets forth procedures of
investigation and evaluation of the proposed placements by the receiving state and
supervision during the continuance of the placements. Any int^ipretarion of the law's
applicability, which avoids these investigative and evaluation praceduios by the Utah
Department of Human Resource doe* MH accomplish the law's porpo* es. In the
Complaint for the pending state suit, the plaintiffs assert thar9 as placement agencies
licensed under Utah law, They are responsible for protecting children. This may be true,
but it does not invalidate or set aside the powers conferred upen the Utah Department to
follow and enforce compliance with the procedures set our in <h* Compact law, A Utah
child«placine agency cannot choose to have itself regulated or ly hy ttus state's Ucsnsing
Uw and £q Iffpi^g ffc Cofppapl

The contention is that ICPC applies only to children being brwughi into the state for
placement. It is true that an expectant mother brings a fetus i.vo Utah, But no one is
interested in placing a fetus. The meaning of such a transaction is to place a "child",
Article U (d) of ICPC defines placement" as an "arrangement for th<: care of a child"*
An arrangement is not limited to the act of physically transferring possession of a child
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from one custodian to another. Arrangements for the can of a child can he (and are
often) made before the child is bora as wet] as afterward.
If ICPC were meant to limit "placement" to the act of transferring possession, those
would be the words used. The language of Article JI (d) and of the Compa: t as a whole
is conceived to apply to the entire placement transaction from the n&gctialfctft between
oui*of*state parties and an in-state ajgency or other placement recipient. Tfat law requires
that the out-of-state party give notice to the receiving state of the intention io make the
specific placement. That is to be followed by investigation of the proposed placement
and the determination by the receiving state compact administrator um (ho placement
does not appear to be contrary to the interests of the child: i.e., a d:*xenninurion that the
proposed placement recipient is able and suitable to tneei the need*; of the particular
child.
In actuality, ICPC is not an ordinary statute of Utah, The Utah enictioe&t is a law which
establishes a contract with all the other slates providing for agreec, triform methods of
protecting children and receiving siates in placement Transactions *hich bagin in one
state and aire consummated in another state. The law (and the contrail which it
establishes) cannor be fulfilled unless all die states party to it and (heir inhabitants
observe its terms. Tfojsr the fact that an states have for a long period of y^sis understood
ICPC to apply to cases such as that of the Pennsylvania birth&other needs to be
recognized. The Utah Compact Administrator and other cognnsaui Utah officials have
shared that understanding for the quarter century since Utah enacted the Compact
The dase of the Pennsylvania binhmothcr is peculiar only in char shfc cam e to Utah, gave
birth and relinquished her child to the Agency durihg the period *twn At; federal court's
temporary injunction was ostensibly in effect. For that reason, die suggestion made
earlier in this lener for handling this single case may be appropr ate. Bus in all other
respects this case is typical of an inappropriate way to attempt circumveution of the
XTompacr? ICPC spplfc* *» Sti*!1 T*«f*
Finally, it may be helpful to comment on the contention in (be r lamdifc' Complaint that
to apply ICPC to caies such as arc diaeiwed War* weald interfrru with n birthmother's
constitutionally protectedrightto travel That constitutional question vas extensively
discussed in materials sent to you some months ago. In particular, we call your attention
to our Analysis of Florida Depanment of Health and Rehabilitaiori Services v. Friends of
Children. The memo which we wrote to Swn A£h4aum has rc.ulied in the Florid*
Depanment abandoning its previous belief that ii was boundfc/ * e Friends of Children
Opinion. Briefly, the point is that ICPC 4oes not regulate anyone's right to travel.
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Expectant mothers, and anyone else wishing to travel from ant sure t.» another may also
da so in, order to accomplish a Uwjul placement of a child, TC'FC only regulates the
placement of children across state lines, Ii prescribes the aepj which placers and orhers
must take to protect children when interstate placements are mad,:,
I hope thai this mibrmarioh is helpful to you.
Sincerely,

Mitchell Wendell, Ph.D., J.D.
Enclosure: Ashdo*n letter dated 8/29/01
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American Public Human Services Association

Assffciation of Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the Placwnnnt of Children
August 29, 2001

Mr. Sum Ashdown
Compact Administrator
Interstate Compact Office
Family Safety Program
Florida Department of Children & Families
1317 Vmewood Blvd.
Tallahame, tforida 32399-0700
Dear Sam:

Thanks vety much for your prompt mention to our memos in the Georgia Horidu-Iown
siruadan. Since you and your Counsel will be considering the court matter-, perhaps it would
be well for you to share this letter with your Counsel.
We agree with almost everything you write in your August 27 e-mwL Thai u why we have
advised Sarah Stark TO accept the ICPC-1DDA from Florida and process d< c±se.
On the murer of ainorneys and agencies paying birthmothfcr's medical enemies, ICPC has
no provisions. If a state's applicable laws forbid or otherwise regulate the payment of such
medical expenses, chfcy should be applied and the offending party subject* d to whatever
penalties the state law contains.
The part of your me*s*ge chat r*iac? s problem *s ^mt which suggests the child b? fully

protected by Florida law. You point our that upon the birth, a birth ceraf ,e<Lte wa? obtained
and the child was turned over to Ac Florida Agency in accordance with Florida law IQ?C is
npw being used to make a placement from Florida to Iowa.
You suggest that since ICHJD js in be liberally eonssued (Article X), it is proper \y> Substitute
the protections that are now available under Other Florida laws and prorvrtlures tor those
which would have been applicable under ICFC
But the use of ICPC is mandatory. (Article IXL (a).) It was a violation of the Compact for tne
birthmother to go to Florida under ch* circumstances of thw case and chsre co hare
surrendered Her child without a prior favorable determination pursuant to Ajmek III (d)<

Ar\ *lf<fi*ie of me American Pubbe Hvm*-n K*fvt<** AsscxMuan, repfeitnimg oufclic nufflsn • W-MI « iiri-S 1930
H10 first Jwei-NE Suit* SCO. Washington, 0C 200Q2^2S? * (202) S82-01Q0 » fac 1202! IBMS". i j
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The implication in your statements is that the Florida Agency is a duly licensed and a
sadaftcrory one. But it might have been otherwise- The proposed Florida recipient of the
infant could have been an individual of unsuitable character or a "fly-by-ni*ht'# agtacy, A
timely ICPC-100A from Georgia to the Florida CompacT Office would have given
opportunity to ascertain the situation before the placement with the AgenCy was ir,ide and
for you to approve or dfeny the placement, in accordance with the facts as -<<u fbuiid and
evaluated than.
As you know, ICPC is a conwet among the states as veil as statutory la* in each rate. The
states have agreed rhat ICPC procedures are the ones to be used in intercut* placements.
Liberal construction of the Compact does not mean that in each case one 5i-j*; can
determine whether ICPC or some other stature of the state is to be used to provide
protection for the child, liberal construction means thai die Compact should be construed
so as to Afford protection of TCPC to as many interstate cases as possible.
Another purpose of ICPC is to protect the interests of the states involved. In this instance,
you apparently believe that the child will not be "dumped" on Florida or, Did: if something
goes wrong, eh* Agency can actually be held liable to produce a result satisfactory in your
scare. Bur there are cases in which it would be otherwise.
In addition 10 the legal reasons for requiring compliance vtith ICPC in the jirthmoiher cases*
there is a practical necessity. If attorneys, agencies, placement recipients in J o h&i are given
die opportunity » decide whether to comply with the Compact and when to satisf) only die
laws of Florida (other dhan ICPC), many will decide m ignore the Compact. V e alri.ady
know that a substantial number of attorneys and agencies solicit pregnant women to come to
them and surrender rheir children. They often do so spocifieally ro circumxew ICPC
Among those who act in this way arc people who are questionable as placement reiipientfCompact administrators and other state officials should not encourage evasion. Payment; of
die birthmother's medical expenses or giving her other compensation is nr* the only vice.
Avoidance of prior home studies and evaluations is equally serious.
In your present instance with Iowa, there is at least the fact that ICPC is b mitf user! to
determine the suirabiliry of the preadoptwe placement in Towa. But if the |k\Urice,which
Florida has been following, Is continued, the result also will be to continue, allowing pregnant
women from Georgia and elswherfe to come to Florida and to release then; infant: to
Florida placement recipients. In such case*, neither your Deparroent nor a*y othtir public
officials will have had an opportunity to check the proposed placements.
Because of its specific facts (including the current and long standing Florida interpretation),
the Secretariat agrees that Iowa should process this current case. Howeve\ if Florida sees fit
to change its view to conform to the practice and interpretation in other .'jftttts* ICPC can
and should be applied in future cases. Of course, it would be appropriate to pubheiae the
change so that everyone would have a reasonable opportunity to know w ™t &* l^w U and
to comply.
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As suggested in Dennis'* coxnmunicadon of Augusr 27,1 beiieve it will b; hulpfij] fof us to
hold a telephone discussion involving Dennis, you and me. Certainly, thee* should be a
thorough interchange of vie^
Best regards,

Mitchell Wendell
Legal Consultant
p.su Whac I have sajd about birthmochers coming inro Fbrida also pecrair s tw birrhmothers
leaving Florida and going to ill of the other states. For the reasons preset iv,d in our memo
to you of August 27, the "right to travel11 is not a valid afgument against r enuring
compliance with the Compact However, under the interpretations ti/hich Honda currently
uses, Florida pr&gnant women should be able ro engagfc in the sam* practice (of i ourse, ai
advised by their attorneys nag adopdon agencies} in other states*
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4.2
ARTICLES OF ORGANIZATION
Article I. Establishment
The Association of Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children,
hereinafter referred to as "the Association", is hereby established.
Article II. Purposes and Functions
The Association \s for the purpose of facilitating administration of the Interstate Compact on the
Placement of Children and considering, formulating and promulgating rules and regulations as
contemplated in Article VII of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children. In addition, the
Association may:
(a) Consider problems relating to the interjurisdictional placement of children from or to states
party to the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children.
(b) Recommend procedures and remedies for child placement problems and any related
matters of child care, supervision and disposition: including but not limited to changes in
administrative practice and law.
(c) Develop and promulgate forms for use in the administration of the Interstate Compact on
the Placement of Children.
(d) Facilitate acquaintance, cooperation, consultation and exchange of information among and
between the officials who serve as Compact Administrators and their agencies.
(e) To do all other things necessary, appropriate or incidental to its affairs.
Article III. Membership
The members of the Association shall be the Compact Administrators from the party states and such
Deputy Compact Administrators as may have been appointed in accordance with the laws and
procedures of the state involved.

Each party state shall be entitled to one vote which shall be cast by the Compact Administrator from
that state, if present and by a Deputy Administrator from the state, if the Compact Administrator is
not present No Compact Administrator or Deputy Compact Administrator shall be entitled to
participate in the business of the Association as a member, unless there is on file with the Association
Secretariat written notice of the identity and appointment of said Administrator or Deputy and unless
such appointment has not been superseded, revoked, or rendered inoperative because the
Administrator or Deputy no longer holds an office or employment in the state government involved.
Action of the Association shall be only by affirmative vote of a majority of those present and voting.
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Article V. Meetings
The annual meeting of the Association shall be held at such time and place as shall be determined by
the Executive Committee. Special meetings may be held on call of the President at such time and
place as he shall determine, or by demand in writing addressed to the Secretariat by the Compact
Administrator or Deputy Administrator representing not less than 1/3 of the party states. Notice of
the annual meeting shall be sent to all Compact Administrators and Deputy Compact Administrators
by mail, at least: thirty days in advance of the meeting. Notice of special meetings shall be the same as
for an annual meeting, except that it may be on ten days notice and shall be accompanied by an
agenda setting forth in reasonable detail the business proposed to be transacted.
Article VI. Officers
(a) The officers of the Association shall be a President, Vice President and Treasurer and
shall be chosen from among the members of the Association. A vacancy in an office shall occur
whenever the office-holder resigns therefrom or ceases to be a members of the Association.
(b) The President shall perform the duties and have the prerogatives customarily inherent in
the office of the President, including presiding at meetings and having general responsibility for the
administration of the Association. The President shall be Chairman of the Executive Committee and
shall be an ex officio member of all other committees -^f the Association unless otherwise specifically
ordered by the Association. At its 1999 Annual Meeting, however, the Association shall elect the
President, Vice President and Treasurer and one member of the Executive Committee to two-year
terms and four members of the Executive Committee to one-year terms. Thereafter, the Association
shall elect officers and Executive Committee members to serve two-year terms as the respective
terms expire. The President shall not be elected to consecutive terms. The Vice President, Treasurer
and non-officer members of the Executive Committee shall not serve more than two consecutive
terms.
(c) The Vice President shall perform the duties, have the prerogatives, and assume the
responsibilities of the President during any time when the President, on account of absence or any
other cause is unable to act. In the event of a vacancy in the office of President, the Vice President
shall succeed to the office of President for the remainder of the unexpired term.
(d) The Treasurer shall have general oversight of the funds of the Association, may require
reports thereon from the Secretariat and shall report to the Association at its annual meeting and at
any other appropriate times on the financial condition of the Association.
(e) The officers of the Association and members of the Executive Committee shall serve
two year terms.
Article VII. Committees
(a) The Association shall have an Executive Committee of nine members: the President, the
Vice President, the Treasurer, the immediate past President, and five other members of the
Association who shall be elected to the Executive Committee by the members of the Association at
Annual Meetings. The Executive Committee shall advise with the President and the Secretariat and,
within the policy directives of the Association, may authorize action on behalf of the Association in
those instances where it would be inappropriate to postpone action until the next ensuring annual
meeting or where it is impracticable to hold a special meeting. Unless a matter requiring study or
review is referred by the President of the Association to another committee, the Executive
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Committee may function thereon as a general committee of the Association The Executive
Committee shall have such other duties and may perform such other functions as the President or
the Association may from time to time assign to it
(b) The Association may create such standing or special committees as it may deem
appropriate If not inconsistent with action of the Association, the President may establish one or
more special committee/ to consider particular subjects or problems
(c) Unless otherwise required by these Articles, or unless otherwise ordered by the
Association, the President shall have power to appoint the Chairperson of each committee The
Chairperson, after consulting with the President and the Secretariat, shall appoint the other members
of his/her committee To the extent practicable, the Chairperson shall appoint members of the
Association expressing a desire to serve on the committee The Chairperson shall promptly notify the
President and the Secretariat of all appointments to the committee
(d) At each Annual Meeting, the Association shall elect one person who will serve as an
alternate member of the Executive Committee The person elected as an alternate shall be that
person who received the next-highest number of votes to all of the persons who were elected to the
non-officer positions on the Executive Committee The alternate member will be appointed to fill
the unexpired term of a member of the Executive Committee whenever a vacancy occurs in the
unexpired term of any member of the Executive Committee except for the President or Immediate
Past President Unless such an appointment is made, the alternate member will remain inactive for
Executive Committee affairs The President of the Association, in consultation with the members of
the Executive Committee, will determine whether a vacancy has occurred and when such an
appointment will be made In the event that a vacancy occurs in the position of one of the officers of
the Association other than the President or the Immediate Past President, the President of the
Association may appoint either an incumbent non-officer member of the Executive Committee to
the vacated officer position or the alternate member to fill either (1) the position vacated by an
incumbent member of the Executive Committee who assumes the vacant officer position, or (2) the
vacant officer position A vacancy on the Executive Committee, for all positions other than the
President or Immediate Past President, shall occur whenever a member moves from a non-officer
position to an officer position, resigns from the Executive Committee, ceases to be a member of the
Association, or otherwise withdraws from the activities over which the Association has authority
In the event that the alternate member is appointed to become an active member of the
Executive Committee, the President of the Association, in consultation with the members of the
Executive Committee, may appoint another alternate member Such appointment shall be one of the
un-elected candidates for a position on the Executive Committee in the immediately preceding
election Appointments to the position of alternate member may be repeated on every occasion that
an alternate member becomes an active member of the Executive Committee
Article VIII Affiliation with the American Public Human Services Association
(a) Upon approval by the American Public Human Services Association (hereinafter
referred to as "APHSA") in accordance with its procedures, the Association shall be affiliated with
APHSA However, regulations adopted pursuant to Article VII of the Interstate Compact on the
Placement of Children and other implementing actions necessary or appropriate to the
administration of said Compact in accordance with the laws of the several states shall not be subject
to approval by APHSA or any other officer, board committee or representative thereof
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(b) The Secretariat of the Association shall be provided by APHSA. Such Secretariat shall be
responsible for keeping the records of the Association, including the minutes of the annual meeting
and the minutes of any special meetings. The Secretariat shall attend all meetings of the Association
and participate therein but shall not vote. The Secretariat shall perform such additional functions as
negotiated with APHSA- APHSA is hereby designated as Sectetasiat of the Association.
(c) Funds to include dues contributed or appropriated from any source for the specific use
of the Association shall be held by APHSA and administered and disbursed for the benefit of the
Association and its activities in accordance with the financial practices of APHSA.
Article IX. Dues
The amount of annual fees due to be paid by each party state shall be determined by the APHSA
Board of Directors based on program plans and recommendations of the Association md after
review and recommendation of the Executive Committee of the Association. Such amount shall be
billed by the Secretariat and payable at the beginning of the Association's fiscal year.
Article X- Parliamentary Authority
It is the intent that in order to expedite business, the meetings of the Association and its committees
shall be conducted informally. However, when necessary to the effective transaction of business or
on demand of any member, the business of the Association shall be conducted in accordance with
Robert's Rules of Order, Revised.
Article XI. Adoption and Amendments
These Articles of Organization, and any amendments thereto, may be adopted, amended, altered,
supplemented or repealed by majority vote at any meeting of the Association, provided notice is
given, in the same manner as provided for notices of annual meetings. A notice of a proposed
Amendment shall contain the text of the proposed Amendment or a summary thereof sufficient to
indicate with particularity its purpose and content.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS AND SERVICES FOR
CHILDREN, a Utah non-profit corporation, dba
ACT OF LOVE, ADOPTION CENTER OF
CHOICE, INC., a Utah corporation, and A TLC
ADOPTION, a Utah corporation,
Plaintiffs,

SECOND AMENDED
COMPLAINT FOR
DECLARATORY AND
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

v.

MICHAEL CHAPMAN, in his official capacity as
Deputy Compact Administrator of the Interstate
Compact on Placement of Children and in his
official capacity as President of the Association of
Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the
Placement of Children; ROBIN ARNOLDWILLIAMS, in her official capacity as Executive
Director of the Utah Department of Human
Services; JANICE P. KNAPHUS, in her official
capacity as Licensing Specialist in the Office of
Licensing of the Utah Department of Human
Services; the UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN
SERVICES, a governmental department of the
State of Utah; DENNIS ESHMAN, in his official
capacity as Manager of the Secretariat Staff of the
Association of Administrators of the Interstate
Compact on the Placement of Children, the
ASSOCIATION OF ADMINISTRATORS OF THE
INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE
PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN, and the
AMERICAN PUBLIC HUMAN SERVICES
ASSOCIATION, in its capacity as Secretariat of
the Association of Administrators of the Interstate
Compact on the Placement of Children,
Defendants.

Civil No. 020905025

Judge Stephen L. Henriod

Plaintiffs Alternative Options and Services for Children, a Utah non-profit
corporation, dba Act of Love, Adoption Center of Choice, Inc., and A TLC Adoption, Inc. bring
this second amended complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants Michael
Chapman, in his official capacity as Deputy Compact Administrator of the Interstate Compact on
Placement of Children and in his official capacity as President of the Association of
Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, Robin Arnold-Williams,
in her official capacity as Executive Director of the Utah Department of Human Services, Janice
P. Knaphus, in her official capacity as a Licensing Specialist in the Office of Licensing of the
Utah Department of Human Services, the Utah Department of Human Services, a governmental
department of the State of Utah, Dennis Eshman, in his official capacity as Manager of
Secretariat Staff of the Association of Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the Placement
of Children, the Association of Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of
Children, and the American Public Human Services Association, in its capacity as Secretariat of
the Association of Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, and
complain and allege as follows:
PARTIES, VENUE AND JURISDICTION
1.

Plaintiff Alternative Options and Services for Children, dba Act of Love

("Act of Love") is a Utah non-profit corporation and is a licensed child-placing agency in the
state of Utah.
2.

Plaintiff Adoption Center of Choice, Inc. ("Adoption Center"), is a Utah

corporation and is a licensed child-placing agency in the state of Utah.
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3.

Plaintiff A TLC Adoption, Inc. ("TLC") is a Utah corporation and is a

licensed child-placing in the state of Utah.
4.

Defendant Michael Chapman ("Chapman") is an individual residing in the

state of Utah and, upon information and belief, has been appointed as the Deputy Compact
Administrator responsible for coordination of all activities under the Interstate Compact on
Placement of Children (Utah Code § 62A-4a-701, hereinafter "ICPC") for the state of Utah, and
who is serving as President of the Association of Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the
Placement of Children for the years 2001 through 2003..
5.

Defendant Robin Arnold-Williams ("Arnold-Williams") is an individual

residing in the state of Utah and is the Executive Director of the Utah Department of Human
Services, the department of Utah government responsible for activities under the ICPC.
6.

Defendant Janice P. Knaphus ("Knaphus") is an individual residing in the

state of Utah and is a Licensing Specialist in the Office of Licensing of the Utah Department of
Human Services with oversight responsibilities for adoption agencies.
7.

Defendant Utah Department of Human Services (the "Department"), is the

department, through its Division of Child and Family Services, responsible for accepting and
reviewing information submitted in connection with placement of children across state lines
pursuant to the ICPC, and is also responsible, through its Office of Licensing, for licensing
adoption agencies.
8.

Defendant Dennis Eshman is an individual who is serving as Manager of

the Secretariat Staff of the Association of Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the
Placement of Children.
3
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9.

The Association of Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the

Placement of Children (the "AAICPC") is an organization based in Washington, D.C., that was
established as an affiliate of the American Public Human Services Association (the "APHSA").
Its members are the Compact Administrators and Deputy Compact Administrators of each of the
United States and territories that have adopted the ICPC.
10.

The APHSA is a nonprofit organization that is based in Washington, D.C.,

that is an affiliate of the AAICPC, and that serves as Secretariat of the AAICPC.
11.

This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

12.

Utah's Declaratory Judgment statute, Utah Code Ann.

§78-3-4(1).

§ 78-33-1, also grants this Court the "power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations."
Moreover, "[a]ny person... whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a
statute . . . may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the . . .
statute . . . and obtain a declaration ofrights,status or other legal relations thereunder." Utah
Code Ann. § 78-33-2.
13.

Venue is proper in this district pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-7.

14.

This Court has jurisdiction over the out-of-state defendants because they,

among other things, have transacted business in this state and provided services in this state by
giving advice and guidance to the Utah defendants as to the applicability of the ICPC on child
placement issues generally and specifically as to Utah placement issues.
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COMMON ALLEGATIONS
15.

The ICPC is uniform legislation in force in all 50 states. It requires

agencies, entities, and persons seeking to place children across state lines to obtain prior approval
for placements. The approval process requires the party placing the child to give notice of the
placement to the ICPC administrator and other appropriate public authorities. An evaluation of
the suitability of the placement is performed to determine if it is in the best interest of the child to
approve the placement.
16.

As licensed child-placing agencies, plaintiffs are charged by the state of

Utah with the responsibility to protect the best interests of the children who are relinquished to
them for adoption. Plaintiffs are required to follow certain regulations designed to protect the
children, the birth parents, and adoptive parents in the adoption process. Thus, plaintiffs are
charged with protecting the same interests the ICPC seeks to protect.
17.

Plaintiffs are often contacted by expectant mothers outside of the state

who are contemplating placing their expected children for adoption.
18.

Sometimes, to facilitate the adoption process, these non-resident expectant

mothers travel to Utah to obtain pre-natal services and care necessary to deliver the child safely.
19.

The children are then delivered in Utah facilities and may be placed for

adoption through plaintiffs' agencies, although each birth mother retains the right to keep her
baby until she actually signs a relinquishment or consent to adoption, which cannot occur until at
least 24 hours after the baby is born.
20.

A substantial part of plaintiffs' businesses involve expectant birth mothers

who travel to Utah to deliver their babies and to place them for adoption.
5

21.

Defendants have taken the position that the ICPC must be complied with

for an expectant mother to travel to Utah to deliver her child in Utah.
22.

Defendants take their interpretation from a June 30,1986 opinion issued

by the Secretariat of the AAICPC, Secretariat Opinion #49 ("Opinion #49").
23.

Opinion #49 does not have the force of law and has not been adopted as

the law in Utah.
24.

In 2000, Knaphus, on behalf of the Office of Licensing and at Chapman's

instruction, cited Act of Love for a licensing violation for failing to obtain prior approval before
an expectant mother was brought into the state of Utah to deliver her child. The Office of
Licensing withdrew the violation after Act of Love questioned the application of the ICPC to the
situation.
25.

On November 21, 2001, an attorney for the Department of Human

Services wrote to an attorney for Act of Love that "the Office of Licensing has been instructed,
as of November 19, 2001, to enforce those [ICPC] requirements with regard to all licensed child
placing agencies." This language referred to requiring agencies to obtain ICPC approval when
helping an expectant birth mother travel to Utah.
26.

This letter resulted from guidance received by Arnold-Williamsfroman

assistant Utah Attorney General recommending that the Department use Opinion #49 "as
guidance for the department's regulatory actions, specifically for the Office of Licensing and the
Division of Child and Family Services."
27.

Similarly, on December 3, 2001, Knaphus sent a letter to each plaintiff

informing them that as of November 19, 2001, the Office of Licensing and the Department "have
6

been directed to utilize [Opinion #49] on all regulatory and licensing actions concerning child
placing agencies where expectant mothers residing in another state travel to Utah to give birth
and place their child for adoption."
28.

Pursuant to the ICPC, a violation of its provisions can result in the

suspension or revocation of plaintiffs' licenses as child-placing agencies.
29.

Shortly after receiving the December 3, 2001 letter, plaintiffs filed suit in

federal court challenging the interpretation of the ICPC found in Opinion #49. That action was
dismissed without prejudice by the federal court on jurisdictional grounds.
30.

During the pendency of the federal court action, defendants stipulated to a

preliminary injunction against enforcement of the ICPC in situations where an expectant mother
comes to Utah to deliver her baby and place it for adoption. The federal court signed that
injunction on February 6,2002.
31.

On March 1, 2002, during the pendency of the federal action and while the

federal injunction was in place, Knaphus sent a corrective action plan and afindingof a licensing
violation to Adoption Center of Choice for violating the December 3, 2001 letter.
32.

During a hearing on cross motions for summary judgment in the federal

action held June 7, 2002, counsel for defendants represented to the federal court that under the
ICPC the state of residence of an expectant birth mother does not need to give approval for a
birth mother to come to Utah to deliver her baby and place it for adoption with a Utah adoption
agency. Counsel represented that only approval of the Utah ICPC administrator needs to be
obtained in such situations and that the state of residence of the birth mother simply needs to be
notified that the birth mother is in or is coming to Utah to deliver.
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33.

Counsel for defendants also represented to the federal court that a Utah

adoption agency can sign an ICPC 100A form as a "sending agency" if the Utah adoption agency
is bringing a birth mother into Utah to deliver her baby and place it for adoption with the Utah
adoption agency.
34.

Following the federal court summary judgment hearing, a situation arose

with Act of Love concerning a baby who was born in Utah in May, 2002, to a non-resident birth
mother, and relinquished to Act of Love on or about May 24, 2002. The baby was born and
placed with Act of Love during the pendency of the federal court injunction against enforcement
of the ICPC in such cases, and was placed with an adoptive family from Colorado.
35.

In the process of obtaining approval from the Colorado ICPC

administrator, a question was raised about approval for the birth mother's travel from
Pennsylvania to Utah to have her baby. Rather than hassle with bureaucrats over interpretation
of the ICPC, Act of Love decided to proceed as counsel for defendants had represented to the
federal court the ICPC process should work. Act of Love signed the ICPC papers as sending
agency and submitted an ICPC package to Chapman as the Utah administrator for approval. This
was done on the basis of Chapman's counsel's representation to the federal court that approval
of the Pennsylvania ICPC administrator was not required.
36.

Chapman, however, contrary to his counsel's representations to the federal

court, said Act of Love could not sign as sending agency, and said approval of, not just
notification to, the Pennsylvania administrator is required.
37.

Instead, Chapman placed approval of the placement into Colorado on hold

pending approval from Pennsylvania.
8
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38.

Approval from the Pennsylvania administrator was significantly delayed

because Pennsylvania requires birth parents to sign a particular form peculiar to Pennsylvania.
When presented with the Pennsylvania form to sign, the birth parents refused to sign and retained
an attorney to try to get their child back from Act of Love. Only recently did the birth mother,
but not the birth father to whom she is married, agree to sign the form.
39.

Chapman, however, required the birth mother, rather than Act of Love to

sign the ICPC 100A form as the sending agency, rather than allowing Act of Love to sign as
sending agency as Chapman's counsel represented to the federal court. Once this was done, and
based only on the birth mother's signature, Pennsylvania finally gave its approval for the
placement, but it took nearly two months to complete and increased Act of Love's costs in the
adoption, as well as the real costs expended by the adoptive family as they had to wait for
approval to take the child to Colorado.
40.

Plaintiffs believe that while this specific situation may be resolved,

because of defendants' interpretations of the ICPC, this type of situation is clearly capable of
repetition while evading review. Only because Act of Love sought to protect the interests of the
adoptive family and did as Chapman requested did approval come. Had Act of Love sued on the
facts presented and awaited an outcome, it is likely the placement would have been disrupted.
Yet, had Chapman done as his counsel represented to the federal court, the situation likely would
have been resolved several weeks ago.
41.

As Act of Love was attempting to obtain approval of the Pennsylvania to

Utah to Colorado situation, upon information and believe, Chapman requested advice from the
AAJCPC. On July 9, 2002, a lawyer with the AAICPC sent Chapman a seven-page letter
9

reiterating that organization's adherence to Opinion #49, offering advice concerning the specific
situation presented, and opining that this lawsuit can have no effect on interpretation of the ICPC
outside of Utah. This letter was not provided to any of plaintiffs by Chapman.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Declaratory Judgment)
42.

Plaintiffs restate and reallege all preceding paragraphs and incorporate the

same here by this reference.
43.

The ICPC applies only when a "child" from another state is brought or

sent to any other state for placement in foster care or preliminarily for a possible adoption.
44.

The ICPC defines "child" as "a person who, by reason of minority, is

legally subject to parental, guardianship, or similar control." ICPC, Article 11(1). The definition
of "child" in the ICPC does not include a fetus or an unborn child.
45.

The ICPC further requires the party placing a child across state lines to

give notice, containing, among other things, the name, date, and place of birth of the child, and
the identity and address or addresses of the parents or legal guardian. ICPC, Article 111(2).
46.

When an expectant mother travels to Utah, the "child" to be placed for

adoption is not "brought" or "sent" under the ICPC. The child is, therefore, not brought to Utah
across state lines and the ICPC does not apply.
47.

Indeed, until the child is relinquished to one of plaintiffs' agencies, the

child is not subject to placement and remains in the legal custody and control of the birth mother.
48.

Furthermore, Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-15.1 provides that the ICPC only

must be complied with in an adoption proceeding when the child is born out of state.
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Plaintiffs are entitled t< i declaration from this Court finding 'that 'the
ICPC does not apply to situations where an expectant mothei travels to Utah and delivers a child
here.
^U/UiND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Declaratory Judgment)
50.

Plaintiffs restate and reallege all preceding paragraphs and incorporate (lie

51.

The interpretation ot the ICPC made by Opinion #49 and adopted by

same

defendants alio r iringes uu tru - $.,.• , i ai. i \pet
intent •

**

-r.r^ses-i rvr^11, <** ''* ™;Uaiii niuthn s iraveling state to state In

requiring compliance with the !( P( when the expectant mother desires to travel to another Mate
to o, >r.... „*.: _

. and in pi

52.

c idnptinn

Expectant mothers from I Itah do not have to go through these same ICPC

approval procedures to place their children with plaintiffs' s agencies,
53.

' Because < tpinn HI, f!4c>'s interpretation of the ICPC and the consequent

requirements de1 /ndants have imposed upon plaintiffs impair expectant mothers' constitutional
n-<hw k* *ra\ei

. . >..UTpreia

.

...

' * •

•?

acting in concert with diem, should be enjoined from enforcing the interpretation.,
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Declaratory Judgment)
54.

Plaintiffs restate and reallege all preceding paragraphs and incorporate the

sam«.- here by this reference.
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55.

Article III of the ICPC only requires approval of the "receiving state" for a

placement of a child across state lines to occur. Nowhere in the ICPC does it state that approval
of the "sending state" is required, and nowhere in the ICPC is "sending state" defined.
56.

Article III of the ICPC also provides that only the requirements of the

ICPC and the applicable laws "governing the placement of children" of the "receiving state"
need to be complied with when bringing a child across state lines to place for adoption. Nowhere
in the ICPC does it state that the laws governing the placement of children of the state of
residence of the child need to be complied with.
57.

Article 11(2) of the ICPC defines "sending agency" as anyone "which

sends, brings, or causes to be sent or brought any child to another party state." The definition of
"sending agency" is broad enough to include a Utah adoption agency bringing a child from
another state into Utah.
58.

Plaintiffs ask the Court for a declaration that only the approval of the

"receiving state" must be obtained under the ICPC, that the "sending state" does not need to sign
for or approve a pleicement of a child across state lines, that only the laws of the "receiving state"
governing the placement of children need to be complied with under the ICPC and not the laws
of the sending state, and that a Utah adoption agency can be a "sending agency" under the ICPC
when the agency brings a child from another state for purposes of placement for adoption.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Injunctive Relief)
59.

Plaintiffs restate and reallege all preceding paragraphs and incorporate the

same here by this reference.
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60.

<

to Ik Iiiitgtiai.it o! Ilic

ICPC and Utah law, and una* .\cvemhei 19, 2001, tim m t u ^ . v ^ v . , .,ad not been enforced in
I Jtah.
61.

( '>«VU

•

^

"r •

,

as set .forth above, are cmitrarv u- ihe lansniaue of the H PC
62.

"Ihcse interpretations aic tx-ing VIWUK -u . \ i.ic ; loJj ^lendciiit:* liinii.^h

requirements placed upon licensed child-p] u ; nc ^qencies such as plaintiffs.
63.

A significant part or plaintiffs' businesses involve non-resident, expectant

64.

Plaintiffs will be irreparably harmed if defendants' interpretations found in

1

Opinion #49 and elsewhere are enforced against a ^r>,
65.

Plaintiffs have no adequate ' •*• il (cninl\ -iml imiil rrsuil In Ihi rqml.ihlr

remedy of injunctive relief,
66.
s l 10U ld

1 he I Jtah defendants, and. all those acting in concert "v\ ith defendants,

be enjoined, preliminarily and permanently, from enforcing interpretations of the ICPC

inconsistent with the declarations of this Court, as sought by plaintiffs..
67.

. The A 'Mi "PC (lel« 11«I-• inI • .iiiini ill! Ihi r mlHif1 mi rnm nil v illi ilcfendiiiils

should be e:njoined, preliiiiiiiarily and permanently, from enforcing interpretations of the ICPC
inconsistent with the declarations of this Cour t as sought b) plaintiffs
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs prays for the following relief:
a.

For a declaration that the ICPC does not apply when an expectant mother

t
X J

b.

For a declaration that ICPC approval by the Utah defendants does not need

to be obtained for a child that is born in Utah to a non-resident birth mother.
c.

For a declaration that defendants' interpretation of the ICPC violates an

expectant birth mother's right to travel.
d.

For a declaration that the ICPC does not require signature or approval of

the sending state for a placement to be made across state lines.
e.

For a declaration that the ICPC does not require compliance with the laws

of the sending state when a placement is made across state lines into Utah.
f.

For a declaration that under the ICPC, any one of plaintiffs could sign as a

"sending agency" when they bring a child across state lines for purposes of placing the child for
adoption.
g.

For preliminary and permanent injunctive relief against the Utah

defendants, and all those acting in concert with them,fromenforcing interpretations of the ICPC
inconsistent with declarations made by this Court.
h.

For preliminary and permanent injunctive relief against the AAICPC

defendants, and all those acting in concert with them,fromcontinuing to support and/or advocate
or advance interpretations of the ICPC inconsistent with declarations made by this Court.
L

For attorney fees and costs of this action as may be allowed by law.

j.

For such other and further relief as this Court deems just and equitable.
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WOOD CRAPO LLC

Larry S^. Jenkins ~
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ^ day of September, 2002. a true and
copy of the foregoing SECOND AMENDED COh ir.

.

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF was mailed in the U.S. mail, postage rrenaid, to:
Craig L. Barlow, Esq.
Joel A. Ferre, Esq.
Utah Attorney General's Office
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
P.O. Box 140857
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0857
/
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WOOD CRAPO LLC
Larry S. Jenkins #4854
Richard J. Armstrong #7641
500 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 366-6060

•uJiSfRJCT COURT

02 OCT 16 PML»: 3 5
• A i r LAKE DEPARTMENT
•.DEPUTY CLERK

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY

ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS AND SERVICES
FOR CHILDREN, et al.,

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 020905025
MICHAEL CHAPMAN, et al.,

Judge Stephen L. Henriod

Defendants.

Plaintiffs respectfully move the Court for entry of partial summary judgment in
their favor on the application of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children ("ICPC") to
an expectant mother traveling interstate to Utah to deliver her child and potentially place the
child for adoption. The grounds for this motion are that the plain language of the ICPC cannot
be interpreted to apply in such a situation.
This motion is supported by a memorandum of law in support that is filed
contemporaneously.

DATI'.I Mlus \.

October. 7002.
'JD CRAPO LLC

Larry
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the Ifo day of October, 2002, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
was hand delivered, to:
Craig L. Barlow, Esq.
Joel A. Ferre
Utah Attorney General's Office
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
P.OI. Box 140857
Sail Lake City, Utah 84114-0857
Attorney for Utah Defendants
Michael W. Homer
Paul C. Farr
Suitter Axland
175 South West Temple, Suite 700
P.O. Box 45101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
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Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children
Secretariat Opinion 10 - June 30,1986

Expectant Mothers^Jlrayel lo Another State for Bii th
Can a birthmother who comes to State A from another state in order to give birth and then
places her child with a State A couple thereby avoid application of Interstate Compact on
the Placement of Children? It \s suggested that this is consciously dene on some
occasions wiih the JeLberaie indention of avoiding the Compact,,. However, If the
Compact is not circumvented by this maneuver,- should the birthmother fill out an iCPC100A beforehand9 Can State A process the placement before the child is delivei ed?
There are a variety of reasons why people sometimes seek to covert interstate placements
into intrastate placements. There is sometimes a desire to save the work, cf considering
the laws of the other state. If the prospective adoptive parents are using a local attorney,
they or he may wish to accomplish the entire matter without the need for involving a
lawyer in the other state. Usually these reasons have little or nothing to do with
protecting the interests of the child. In fact, circumventing laws and procedures
specifically designed to protect children in interstate situations may expose both the child
and the others invoived in risks. Neveitheiesi, the desire to avoid regulation or to shorten
procedures is often a powerful motive, further, there is sometimes anxiety lest
observance of protective laws may bring to light some reason why the placement and
adoption sho* ilci. not occui .,
If the child is a day old when the birthmother brings it across the state line to State A and
delivers it to the attorney or to the prospective adoptive parents, there is no doubt that an
interstate placement occurs and that the procedures of the Compact must be followed.
The Compact applies to "bringing" a child to another state for placement ^preliminary to a
possible adoption,,,"
It u.\. birthm* ther comes io Stair \ *me day before delivery M .. ?:\ u-st*-* af*e? gK'i- *,
birth, lurm .c i raid o\er \ <;i anoi-iev or the prospective adoptive parents, it is askec
whether the iaw should not consider the transaction u he intiastate in ; har~~te~ --v i.biect to lK i-r. \£i-\~ ; " r - ; H t r ^ ; i -' -'«*-' •
W here a ch-A-i ;:• ^arsiened from the rusiodx -;-i t * "M: ;i »othei to another party at or very
soon after the- n- m ..• r, A virtual '. v. stv that the arrangements for the placement have
occurred " re the birth and in specific anticipation of it. Where the State A couple is the
recipient of the child and the birthmother is the relinquishing party, it would be sham to
describe the transaction as anything other than the placement by a State X "sending
agency" with a couple in another state (State A).

«•%

Secretariat Opinion 49 - June 30, 1986

, , n,
3.106

Some pregnant women go to maternity homes when they believe that they will place their
bab.es for adoption or when they are undecided as to what they will do. Frequently these
women enter the maternity home a considerable time before birth of the child is expected
The home may be tn their own state of residence or in another state. In the latter
instances, the circumstances of the particular case may need to be looked at specifically to
determine whether they are such as to make the placement of the child an interstate matter
or not In those instances too, an important motivation of the birthmother can be to be
away from her own community during a difficult period. However, that has no bearing on
whether the placement should or should not be considered an interstate one in character.
In other instances, women go to hospitals in another state merely to use the medical
faculties for the birth of their children. This is especiallyfrequentin metropolitan areas
situated at state boundaries. The population of the entire area use the medical and hospital
resources of the region to their best advantage and convenience, without regard to the
state .me. Similar circumstances also can be expected wherever a hospital is near a state
boundary In such instances, it is not appropriate to regard the surrender of a newly born
infant by the birthmother to prospective adoptive parent who live in her own state of
residence as interstate placement requiring application of the Compact. This is true even
when the physical transfer of the child occurs at the hospital in the other state All of the
pre and post transfer aspects of the placement relate to the single state in which both the
birthmother and the prospective adoptive parents live.
Where the expectant mother crosses a state line as part of the placement plan and
arrangement, the transaction should be viewed as an interstate placement. In enacting the
Compact the intent of the state legislatures was not to make the protections of placements
depend on mechanical manipulation of the deliverv point Such logistic calculations are
nothing more than subterfuges and studied efforts tc avoid the interded and normal
consequences of the law. Article X of the ICPC directs that the Compact be "liberally
construed to elTecuate its purposes". As set forth in Article I and evidenced in the entire
pattern of the procedures and requirements specified throughout the Compact, the
emphasis is on the interstate character of the arrangements. If the arrangement process is
interstate, placement is interstate. The definition of "placement" in Article II also supports
this interpretation.
There is some difference of view among the states on whether any work can be done on
the processing of interstate placements before the child is bom. Some take the position
that until the birth actually occurs, there is no assurance that there will be an infant and
that the full circumstances on the basis of which the placement should be evaluated are not
knowable.
We prefer another approach. The time at which the birth is expected is known. The
woman's intention to surrender her child is also present, even if there can be a change of

Secrelaii.il < >|iiiii"»n I

i m MI HI M I

mind up to the very moment v. 1 icn a relii iquishinent is executed, and even during the grace
period that ma ny states allov. for reconsideration, If the prospective adoptive parents are
known and the arrangements are in progress, their personal qualifications and the home
environment into which the infant will go can also be studied and evaluated. If all of this
is done before the birth occurs, all that will normally remain is to determine the condition
of the child and to make a judgment as to whether the already evaluated prospective
adoptive parents and their environment are not contrary to the best interests of the child.
Consequently, we advise that where a state is willing to do so, it should accept di\ ICPC100A and should do most of the processing before the birth occurs. This cai shorter, and
simplify the post birth work and can make the period before approved recipients of a
preadoptive placement can receive custody of the child. This can. do much to reduce the
pressures for neglect and. violation of law in the interest, of speed
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130 Norm 200 wost, Suit© 303
RO.BGX4SS00
Salt U*a City, Utah 841464500
(801)538-4242

December 3, 2001

An e q u a l Opportunity e m p l o y e r

Ms. Kathleen Kunkel, President
A Act of Love
9561 South 700 East, Suite 101
Sandy, UT 84094
RE:

Applicability of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) to child
placing agencies when expectant mothers travel to Utah to give birth and place their
children for adoption.

Dear Ms, Kunkel:
The Department of Human Services has received guidancefromthe Attorney General's Office
regarding the above-referenced issue. The Department is advised to use ICPC Secretariat
Opinion #49 as guidance on this issue. This Opinion clearly states that the Interstate Compact
applies when expectant mothers travel across state lines to give birth and place their children for
adoption. A copy of the Opinion is enclosed for your information and reference.
The Office of Li<?ert$ing and the Division of Child and Family Services have been directed, as of
November 19, 2001, to utilize this opinion on all regulatory and licensing actions concerning
child placing agencies where expectant mothers residing in another state travel to Utah to give
birth and place their child for adoption.
If you have questions or require further clarification regarding this matter, please feel free to call
me at (801) 538-8222 or email me at jknaphus@hs.state,ut.us.
Sincerely,
fee P. Knaphus
Licensing Specialist
cc:

Michael Chapman, DCFS/ICPC
Alan Hayward, Licensing Supervisor
Office of Licensing
Reta Oram, Director
Office of Licensing

Enclosure
JPK/add

State of Utah
Michael 0. Leavitt
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Sail Lake City, Utah 8414S-0SQ0
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December 3, 2001

Mr. James C. Webb, Executive Director
The Adoption Center of Choice, Inc.
241 West 520 North
Orem,UT 84057
Mi

Applicability of the Interstate Compact on 'the Placement of Children (ICPC) to ch. io
placing agencies when expectant mothers travel to Utah to give birth and place the; ?
children for adoption

Dear Mi'. V 'el 1»>;
The Department of Human Services has received guidance from the Attorney General's Office
regarding the above-referenced issue. The Department is advised to use ICPC Secretariat
Opinion #49 as guidance on this issue. This Opinion clearly states that the Interstate Compact
applies when expectant mothers travel across state lines to give birth and place their children for
adoption. A copy of the Opinion is enclosed for your information and. reference.
The Office of Licensing and the Division of Child and Family Services have bcen'dirccted, as of
November 19,2001, to utilize this opinion on all regulatory and licensing actions concerning
child placing agencies where expectant mothers residing in another state travel to Utah, to give
birth and place their child for adoption.
If you have questions or require further clarification ..regarding this matter, please ieei tree to i a 11.
me at (801) 538-8222 or email me atjknaphus@hs.state.utus.
Sincerely

ice P. Knaphus
Licensing Specialist
cc:

Michael Chapman, Dt>8/iCl J (:
Alan Hayward., Licensing Supervisor
Office of Licensing
Reta Oram, Director
Office of Licensing

Enclosure
JFK/add

p.01

State of Utah
Michael 0. Uavitt

Gdfwnor
Robin Arnold-WUliama
Executive Director
MarkS. Ward
Deputy Director
Rata D. Oram
EhrMtor

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES
OFFICE OP LICENSING
120 North 200 Watt, Sulla 303
RO. Box 46500
Salt Laka City, Utah 84145-0500
(801) 636-4242

December 3,2001

an equal opportunity tmployer

Ms, Sandi Bumingham, Director
A TLC Adoption
36 West 850 South
Layton,UT 84041
RE:

Applicability of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) to child
placing agencies when expectant mothers travel to Utah to give birth and place their
children for adoption,

Dear Ms. Bumingham:
The Department of Human Services has received guidance from the Attorney General's Office
regarding the above-referenced issue. The Department is advised to use ICPC Secretariat
Opinion #49 as guidance on this issue. This Opinion clearly states that the Interstate Compact
applies when expectant mothers travel across state lines to give birth and place their children for
adoption, A copy of the Opinion is enclosed for your information and reference.
The Office of Licensing and the Division of Child and Family Services have been directed, as of
November 19,20017 to utilize this opinion on all regulatory and licensing actions concerning
child placing agencies where expectant mothers residing in another state travel to Utah to give
birth and place their child for adoption.
If you have questions or require further clarification regarding this matter, please feel free to call
mc at (801) 538-8222 or email me at iknaphustiflhs.state,utus.
Sincerely,

ice P. Knaphus
Licensing Specialist
cc:

Michael Chapman, DCFS/ICPC
Alan Hayward, Licensing Supervisor
Office of Licensing
Reta Oram, Director
Office of Licensing
s*\
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Article I. Purpose and Policy
policy of the party . u
interstate placement of children to the end that

-

•

•

icr in die

(a) Each child requiring placement shall receive the maximum, opportunity to be
placed in a. suitable environment and with persons or institutions having appropriate
qualifications and facilities to provide a necessary and desirable degree and type of care
(b) The appropriate authorities in a state where a child is to be placed may have full
opportunity to ascertain the circumstances of the proposed placement, thereby
promoting full compliance with applicable requirements for the protection of'the child,,
(c) ' rhe proper authorises of IIK \u\ir from u l i c h ihe placement u> made nia\
obtain the most complete i n f o r m a n t
•-;*- basi- •>! ^l-i.-h t ."vaiuatr A projected
placement before it is mad
(d) Appropriate ]un.^ia. m,.»;,., arrangements
promoted.
Article IL Definitions
As used in this compact:
(a) "Child" means a person, who by reason of minority, is legally subject to parental
guardianship or similar control
(b) '"Sending agency" means a party state, officer or employee thereof; a subdivision
of a party state, or officer or employee thereof; a court of a party state; a person,
corporation, association, charitable agency or other entity which sends, brings, or causes
to be sent or brought any child to another party state,
(c) "Receiving state" means the state to which a child is sent, brought, <JI ausr. P
be sent or brought, whether by public authorities or private persons or agencies, and
whether for placement with state or local public authorities or for placement wit^ r r; * ^
agencies or persons.
(d) "Placement nieai.:. ;i.c ai.aiigLiii.nl t«v the -..are <>f a ^hdd in a family free oi
boarding home or in a child-caring agency- or instituri*u. 1 m .lot-v nt.t unlade anv
institution caring for the mentally ill, mentally defective oi eph:?n< or mv institution
primarily- ed„ Mtion;! i- c^ara^ter v^d anv hospital ^ r 'n}v* "vv- ;: i u din
Article III. C o n d u i t - - i,< . I'layLn .
(a- No -ending agency shall <-nd S'mg, <u cause to be *cm or brought into anv
other party state any child tor placement m foster care or as a preliminary to a possible
adoption unless the sending agency shall comply with each and every requirement set
forth in this article and with the applicable laws of the receiving state governing the
placement of children therein.
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(b) Prior to sending, bringing or causing any child to be sent or brought into a
receiving state for placement in foster care or as a preliminary to a possible adoption, the
sending agency shall furnish the appropriate public authorities in the receiving state
written notice of the intention to send, bring, or place the child in the receiving state.
The notice shall contain:
(1) The name, date and place of birth of the child.
(2) The identity and address or addresses of the parents or legal guardian.
(3) The name and address of the person, agency or institution to or with which
the sending agency proposes to send, bring, or place the child.
(4) A full statement of the reasons for such proposed action and evidence of the
authority pursuant to which the placement is proposed to be made.
(c) Any public officer or agency in a receiving state which is in receipt of a notice
pursuant to paragraph (b) of this article may request of the sending agency, or any other
appropriate officer or agency of or in the sending agency's state, and shall be entided to
receive therefrom, such supporting or additional information as it may deem necessary
under the circumstances to carry out the purpose and policy of this compact.
(d) The child shall not be sent, brought, or caused to be sent or brought into the
receiving state until the appropriate public authorities in the receiving state shall notify
the sending agency, in writing, to the effect that the proposed placement does not appear
to be contrary to the interests of the child.
Article IV, Penalty for Illegal Placement
The sending, bringing, or causing to be sent or brought into any receiving state of a child
in violation of the terms of this compact, shall constitute a violation of the laws
respecting the placement of children of both the state in which the sending agency is
located or from which it sends or brings the child and of the receiving state. Such
violation may be punished or subjected to penalty in either jurisdiction in accordance
with its laws. In addition to liability for any such punishment or penalty, any such
violation shall constitute full and sufficient grounds for the suspension or revocation of
any license, permit, or other legal authorization held by the sending agency which
empowers or allows it to place, or care, for children.
Article V. Retention of Jurisdiction
(a) The sending agency shall retain jurisdiction over the child sufficient to determine
all matters in relation to the custody, supervision, care, and disposition of the child
which it would have had if the child had remained in the sending agency's state, until the
child is adopted, reaches majority, becomes self-supporting or is discharged with the
concurrence of the appropriate authority in the receiving state. Such jurisdiction shall
also include the power to effect or cause the return of the child or its transfer to another
location and custody pursuant to law. The sending agency shall continue to have
financial responsibility for support and maintenance of the child during the period of the
placement. Nothing contained herein shall defeat a claim of jurisdiction by a receiving
state sufficient to deal with an act of delinquency or crime committed therein.
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(b) When the sending agency is a public agency, it may e m u i
with an authorized public or private agency in the receiving state l
performance of one or more services in respect of such case by the latter as agenr foi '!••
sending agency,
(c) Noth ing in this compact shall be construed to prevent a private charitable agency
authorized to place children in the receiving state from performing services or acting as
agents in that state for a private charitable agency of the sending state; nor to prevent the
agency in the receiving state from, discharging financial responsibility for the support and
maintenance of a child who has been placed on behalf of the sending agency without
relieving 'the responsibility set forth in paragraph (a) hereof,
Article VI, Institutional Care of I Mmquent Children
A child adjudicated delinquent may be pla^cu ... ._ -IIMHI:* <
•: u'orher j ,a\
jurisdiction pursuant to this compact but no such placement :> ;' i- m.io. anles> 1R
i hilvi is given a court hearing on notice to the parent or guardian with op. • r.mitv t>. in, *. 1 prior »•> his being sent to such other party jurisdictio*' f'^r ,M,*'ft'!*j • • < \. < l
' finds H j?
hq^-alen
a ion ind

cnild are not available in the sending agency's

'')^
xumA care in the other jurisdiction is in the best interest of rhr .. hild m--:
w I! n * > i p i. v ., * .: n J •.«• hardship.
ArtKk '. i.

<Tnp«m Administrator

Yhc executive head or each jurisdiction party to this compact Mian u<
u. . .
who shall be general coordinator of activities under this compact in hi
N non ii.if
who, acting joindy with like officers of other party jurisdictions, .hall !M\C pm\;
p ro m ulgate * u 1 es an d i egulations to cany o ut mo re effectively th r u: r n \ s and prov 1;«<>!r
of this compact
Article VIIL Limitations
This conij ,

-»ii,:i» -

(a) The sending ot Lnnpiiu -i a viu^
- «'ceiving stair > • i « \ .• ;...
stepparent, grandparent, adult brutl.er or sister, adult uncle or aunt, or his guardian md
leaving 'the 'child with any such relative or non-agency guardian in the receiving state.
(b) Any placement, sending or bringing of a child into a receiving state pursuant to
any other interstate compact to which both the state from which the child is sent or
brought and the receiving state a re party, or to any other agreement between said states
which has the force of law.
» tele DC. Enactment and Withdrawal
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This compact shall be open to joinder by any state, territory or possession of the United
States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and, with the
consent of Congress, the Government of Canada or any province thereof. It shall become
effective with respect to any such jurisdiction when such jurisdiction has enacted the
same into law., Withdrawal from this compact shall be by the enactment of a statute
repealing the same, but shall not take effect until two years after the effective date of such
statute and until written notice of the withdrawal has been given by the withdrawing
state to the Governor of each other party jurisdiction. Withdrawal of a party state shall
not affect the rights, duties and obligations under this compact of any sending agency
therein with respect to a placement made prior to the effective date of withdrawal.
Article X. Construction and Severability
The provisions of this compact shall be liberally construed to effectuate the purposes
thereof. The provisions of this compact shall be severable and if any phrase, clause,
sentence or provision of this compact is declared to be contrary to the constitution of any
party state or of the United States or the applicability thereof to any government, agency,
person or circumstance is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this compact and
the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance shall not be
affected thereby. If this compact shall be held contrary to the constitution of any state
party thereto, the compact shall remain in full force and" effect as to the remaining states
and in full force and effect as to the state affected as to all severable matters.
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. . . w w-nvui *ih J , i:< i a Kansas resident, I iir whose child is born ir Kansas,
comply with the procedures -f the interstate compact on placement o: childr**d hereir
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? - .-. np'? ^:;:, •V)-22~"' '-' " A " •:
Honorable Sam K. Bruner
rrict Judge
ision No. 2
ison County Courthoi ise
ihe, Kansas 66061
r Judge Bruner:
DU request our opinion on whether the interstate compact on placement: of
Ldren applies in the case of a pregnant nonresident mother giving birth n
3as who, before returning to her home state, consents to the adoption of the
{ by a resident Kansan couple. You inform us that both the mother's home
:e and Kansas have enacted the interstate compact on placement of children.
lacted in 1985,, K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 59-2278b states:
'Interstate placements of children shall comply with the procedures contained
:he interstate compact on p] acement of chi 3 d/r-^ ir ~"*- f^-^h A~ v ° " ^ Q - I O H O
amendments thereto. I,;
lacted in 1976, K S.A 38-1202 provides in peirinent parr:
• ARTICLE 11. Definitions
'As used in this compact: (a) * Cl li ] d" n leaiib a ^ L b u u wnu, u2 it-a^ . :
Drity, is legally subject: to parental, guardianship or similar control
'(b) 'Sending agency' means a party state, officer ->r employee thereof; a
livisiori of a party state,, or officer or employee th<jrec:
. \. U M
; .i party
:e; a person, corporation, association, charitable agency or other entity
zh sends, bri ngs, or causes to be sent or brouaht- ^nv ^H-'IH -^ another na^ty
:e,
1
(c) 'Receiving state' means the state tr wlnrh -i • ; : 1 i a s s<--nr broughr ,
Copr
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sed to be sent or brought, whether by public authorities or private persons or
icies, and whether for placement with state or local public authorities or for
:ement with private agencies or persons.
1
(d)
'Placement1 means the arrangement for the care of a child in a family
> or boarding home or in a child-caring agency or institution but does not
.ude any institution caring for the mentally ill, mentally defective or
.eptic or any institution primarily educational in character, and any hospital
>ther medical facility.
•ARTICLE VIII. Limitations.
'This compact shall not apply to: (a) The sending or bringing of a child
» a receiving state by his parent, step-parent, grandparent, adult brother or
er, adult uncle or aunt, or his guardian and leaving the child with any such
tive or nonagency guardian in the receiving state.
'ARTICLE III. Conditions for Placement.
(a) No sending agency shall send, bring, or cause to be sent or brought
any other party state any child for placement in foster care or as a
iminary to a possible adoption unless the sending agency shall comply with
and every requirement set forth in this article and with the applicable laws
he receiving state governing the placement of children therein. . . .f
tiasis added) .
Thus, Kansas has attempted to insure that children brought into Kansas are
rded some protection. See K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 59-2278 (c); K.S.A. 65- 509;
* ex rel. v. Heart Ministries, Inc., 227 Kan. 244 (1980); Matter of Adoption
Dbson, 8 Kan. App. 2d 772 (1983). See also fThe Interstate Placement of
3ren: A Preliminary Report 1 , Council of State Governments (1978); J. Hall,
Out-of-State Placement of Children: A National Survey 2 1 (Major Issues in
lile Justice Information and Training, 1982). Clearly, if a governmental
:y places the child in an out-of-state institution, the procedures contained
le interstate compact on placement of children become applicable. See
>gar v. Parry, 427 N.Y.S. 2d 216 (1980), app. dism., 431 N.Y.S. 2d 813,
:ied on other grounds, 442 N.Y.S. 2d 438.
> situation presented concerns what is essentially a private adoption
.ving a pregnant nonresident mother. K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 59-2278b mandates the
.cability of the interstate compact to adoption proceedings. The required
jdures are set forth at K.S.A. 38-1202. Independent adoptions in Kansas
>rically have occurred without the assistance of a licensed agency. L.
I, 'The Kansas Family Law Handbook,' 6-3, 6-4 (1983). Nationwide estimates
that independent placements exceed agency placements two-to-one. Evans,
ipendent Adoptions: In Whose Best Interests?1, 53 OK. B.J. 1805 (1982).
Ler states' courts involved with adoptions and enforcing procedural
rements contained in the interstate compact focus on the activities of
>ns other than the natural parents of a child. Those courts have indicated
failure to comply with the procedures of the interstate compact on placement
ildren may jeopardize independent adoptions. The Montana supreme court
1
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oved a child from the prospective adoptive parents1 care and placed the child
foster care because the compact procedures were not followed. The Adoption of
.M., 608 P. 2d 130 (1980). In T.M.M. the prospective adoptive couple went to
ther state and picked up the child. The court recognized that the compact did
apply to 'the sending or bringing of a child into a receiving state by his
ent . . . and leaving the child with any such relative or nonagency guardian
the receiving state.f However, the court stated that because the prospective
ptive parents are not relatives of the natural mother, or nonagency guardians,
y were required to comply with the requirements of the compact. Id. at 133.
Arizona supreme court found that a juvenile court was without authority to
ow foster parents to take a minor out of the state for placement unless the
ms of the compact were complied with. Pima v. Fisher, 610 P.2d 64 (Az. 1980).
ssuming, arguendo, that limitations contained in Article VIII(a) of K.S.A.
1202 do not apply to parents and that K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 59-2278b therefore
eludes a mother who does not comply with the compact from bringing her child
o Kansas for the purpose of independently placing that child for adoption, if
child is as yet unborn at the time the mother enters the state the
licability of the compact is limited. Under K.S.A. 38-1202, Article 11(a),
Id means 'a person who, by reason of minority, is legally subject to parental,
rdianship or similar control.1 While an unborn child is subject to a certain
ree of parental control, the term 'child1 within the adoption statutes means a
ing child who can receive attention. In re Adoption of Nelson, 2 02 Kan. 663
69). 'We do not ordinarily use the term child to mean an unborn child.' Id. at
See also Wisdom v. Norton, 507 F. 2d 750 (Conn. 1974); Poole v. Endsley,
F. Supp. 1370 (5th Circ. 1974). Transporting expectant mothers to another
isdiction until the baby is born appears to represent a creative circumvention
the terms of the compact. Note, independent Adoption:
3 Regulating the Middleman,• 24 W.L.J. 327, 334 at note 64 (1985). Such
cumvention is properly addressed by the legislative body possessing the
hority to regulate such matters.
n summary, K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 59-2278b mandates the applicability of procedures
tained in the interstate compact on placement of children to adoption
ceedings. These required procedures are set forth at K.S.A. 38- 12 02.
icle VIII(a) expressly limits the applicability of the compact to certain
sons and situations. There is some question whether these limitations operate
allow a parent to bring his or her child into the state for private adoption
poses. Nevertheless, if a woman is pregnant at the time she enters Kansas she
not, for purposes of the compact, brought a fchild1 into the state. It is
refore our opinion that the procedures contained in the interstate compact on
cement of children and K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 59-2278(b) do not apply to a pregnant
an who enters Kansas and then gives birth.
y truly yours,
ert T. Stephan
orney General of Kansas
Copr. ® West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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Telephone: (801) 532-7300
Attorneys for Defendants Michael Chapman, Dennis Eshman, Association of Administrators of
the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children; and The American Public Human Services
Association
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS AND
SERVICES FOR CHILDREN, et al.,

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE
TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH
RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED

Plaintiffs,
vs.
CaseNo.020905025
MICHAEL CHAPMAN, et al.,
Judge Stephen L. Henriod
Defendants.

The defendants (1) Michael Chapman in his official capacity as President of the Association
of Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children ("AAICPC"), (2) Dennis
Eshman in his official capacity as Secretariat of the AAICPC, (3) the AAICPC, and (4) the American
Public Human Services Association ("APHSA"), through counsel, and pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, move the Court to dismiss plaintiffs' claims against these
defendants for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. This Motion is supported
by the accompanying Memorandum.

DATED this 17th day of October 2002.
SUITTERAXLAND

Michael W. Homer
Paul C. Farr
Attorneys for Defendants Michael Chapman,
Dennis Eshman, Association of
Administrators of the Interstate Compact on
the Placement of Children; and The
American Public Human Services
Association
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 17th day of October, 2002,1 caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON
WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED to be deposited in the United States mail, first-class,
postage prepaid to:
Larry S. Jenkins, Esq.
Richard J. Armstrong, Esq.
WOOD CRAPO LLC

500 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Craig L. Barlow, Esq.
Joel A. Ferre, Esq.
Assistant Attorneys General
Mark L. Shurtleff, Esq.
Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
P.O. Box 140857
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0857
Attorneys for Defendants Robin Arnold-Williams,
Janice P. Knaphus, Utah Department of Human Services
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175 South West Temple, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1480
Telephone: (801) 532-7300
Attorneys for Defendants Michael Chapman, Dennis Eshman, Association of Administrators of
the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children; and The American Public Human Services
Association
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS AND
SERVICES FOR CHILDREN, et al.,

MOTION TO JOIN
CO-DEFENDANTS' MOTION
TO DISMISS

Plaintiffs,
vs.
Case No.020905025
MICHAEL CHAPMAN, et al.,
Judge Stephen L. Henriod
Defendants.

The defendants (1) Michael Chapman in his official capacity as President of the Association
of Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children ("AAICPC"), (2) Dennis
Eshman in his official capacity as Secretariat of the AAICPC, (3) the AAICPC, and (4) the American
Public Human Services Association ("APHSA"), through counsel, join the Motion to Dismiss filed
on July 1, 2002, by defendants Robin Arnold-Williams, Janice P. Knaphus, Utah Department of
Human Services, and Michael Chapman in his official capacity as Deputy Compact Administrator

of the Interstate Compact on Placement of Children. Defendants adopt the Memorandum filed by
co-defendants in support thereto, and request this Court dismiss plaintiffs' claims.
DATED this 17th day of October 2002.
SUITTERAXLAND

Michael W. Homer
Paul C. Farr
Attorneys for Defendants Michael Chapman,
Dennis Eshman, Association of
Administrators of the Interstate Compact on
the Placement of Children; and The
American Public Human Services
Association
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 17th day of October, 2002,1 caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing MOTION TO JOIN CO-DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS to be
deposited in the United States mail, first-class, postage prepaid to:
Larry S. Jenkins, Esq.
Richard J. Armstrong, Esq.
WOOD CRAPO LLC

500 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Craig L. Barlow, Esq.
Joel A. Ferre, Esq.
Assistant Attorneys General
Mark L. Shurtleff, Esq.
Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
P.O. Box 140857
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0857
Attorneys for Defendants Robin Arnold- Williams,
Janice P. Knaphus, Utah Department of Human Services
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS AND SERVICES
FOR CHILDREN, a Utah non-profit
corporation, dba ACT OF LOVE,
ADOPTION CENTER OF CHOICE, INC., a
Utah corporation, and A TIC
ADOPTION, a Utah corporation,
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INDEX
Witness:

MICHAEL RONALD CHAPMAN
Examination By Mr. Jenkins:
Information Requested:
Exhibits Marked For Identification
Plaintiffs'
1 Copy of Utah ICPC Adoptions Checklist;
1 page

DEPOSITION OF
MICHAEL RONALD CHAPMAN

Plaintiffs,

2
Civil No. 2:01 CV 983 J

vs.
MICHAEL CHAPMAN, in his official
capacity as Compact Administrator of
the Interstate Compact on Placement
of Children; ROBIN ARNOLD-WILLIAMS,
in her official capacity as
Executive Director of the Utah
Department of Human Services;
JANICE P. KNAPHUS, in her official
capacity as Licensing Specialist in
the Office of Licensing of the Utah
Department of Human Services; and
the UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN
SERVICES, a governmental department
of the State of Utah,

10
11

3

Page
4
None

13

Copy of Form 100A Interstate Compact Placement
Request; 1 page
22
Copy of 62A-4a-701 Interstate Compact on
Placement of Children - Text; 3 pages
24

12
4
13

Copy of Interstate Compact on the Placement
of Children, Secretariat Opinion 49 June 30, 1986; P00020-P00022; 3 pages

41

14
5
15
16

6

Copy of Public/Consumer Complaint Information
Form, Form 712; P00030-P00032; 3 pages
50
Copy of 8/9/00 E-mail to Janice Knaphus from
Michael Chapman re ICPC questions; 1 page
55

17
7

Copy of 12/18/01 E-mail to Richard Anderson
from Michael Chapman re A Act of Love Adoption
Agency ICPC Referrals; 1 page
6i

8

Copy of Stipulation Preliminary Injunction
and Order on Briefing on Summary Judgment
Motion; 4 pages

18
19

Defendants.

20

66

21

April 1, 2002
Location: WOOD CRAPO LLC
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Reporter: Amy Shemon, CSR, RPR
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah

9
22
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Janice P. Knaphus re Corrective Action Plan
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23
Reporter's Certificate:

80

24
25
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FOR THE PLAINTIFFS:

LARRY JENKINS, Esq.
WOOD CRAPO LLC
500 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
FOR THE DEFENDANTS:
JOEL A. FERRE
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 140857
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857
CRAIG BARLOW, Assistant Attorney General
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
ALSO PRESENT: Barry Adams
Sandi Burningfiam
Emily Kohlhase
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, MONDAY, APRIL 1, 2002, 1:30 P.M.
*****
PROCEEDINGS
(Joel Ferre and Emily Kohlhase were absent at the
beginning of the following proceedings.)
THE REPORTER: It is 1:30 p.m. on April 1, 2002.
My name is Amy Shemon with CitiCourt, 50 South Main Street,
Suite 920, Salt Lake City, Utah. He are here to take the
deposition of Michael Chapman in the case of Alternative
Options and Services for Children, et al. versus Michael
Chapman, et al.
Present are Larry Jenkins for the Plaintiffs and
Craig Barlow for the Defendants. Also present are Barry
Adams and Sandi Burningham.
MICHAEL RONALD CHAPMAN,
having been first duly sworn by the Reporter, was
examined and testified as follows:
EXAMINATION
BY MR. JENKINS:
Q Would you please state your full name?
A Michael Ronald Chapman.
Q Mr. Chapman, have you ever had your deposition
taken before?
A Yep.
Q You have. So you kind of understand the procedures

4
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801.532.3441
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1

a little bit, and you understand that the court reporter is
going to be taking down everything I say and everything you
say and anything that anybody else says. So it's important
that both of us speak clearly and we respond audibly, talk
audibly so that she can take down the things that we say.
You understand that you are under oath.
Would you briefly give le your educational background
after high school?
A I have a bachelors of arts in social science and I
have attended several different courses working on my masters
program and other courses of that nature.
Q So you have a bachelors and you don't have a
masters yet. Is that what you are saying?
A les.
Q Now, you say you have taken other courses towards
your masters. About ho^w far along do you think you are in
the masters process?
A I probably have another year.
Q When did you get your bachelors?
A March 1971.
Q Where did you get that from?
A Portland State University.
Q Do you hold any licenses or anything like that?
A I as a certified social worker for the State of
Arizona, and that's up every two years.
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A No.
Q Could you briefly give me your work experience
after college?
A I worked for the State of Arizona for 25 years as a
supervisor. I started off as a supervisor in the Cottage for
Handicapped Children for six months and then went to be a
social service worker — social worker during different
years, and then I was a supervisor for three years. And then
I — in February of 1987 I came to the Arizona Interstate
Compact and worked there 10 years.
I retired, took off nine months, and then I came to Utah
as the compact administrator on August 3rd, 1998 and have
been there ever since.
Q Let me ask you. Is your title compact
administrator or is it something different in Utah?
A Oh, in Utah deputy compact administrator.
Q Is there a compact administrator that supervises
you?
A Yeah, Patti Van Wagoner is my supervisor.
Q Is her title compact administrator?
A Um-hua.
Q Now, it sounds like ~ So you graduated in '71 and
went to work in Arizona for the State. The biggest chunk of
time it looks like, until about 1987, you were a social.
worker. Here you assigned to any specific kinds of cases or

5
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

7
PAGE 8

PAGE 6

1
Q What does it mean to be a certified social worker
2
in Arizona? I think I know what it means here, but what does
3
it mean down there?
4
A Well, I can — If you work for the State of
5
Arizona, you don't need to be licensed to have a
6
certification. But if you work for a private agency, then
7
you need to have some type of certification.
8
Q Are there like educational requirements to be a
9
certified social worker, or do you just have to take a test?
A Well, different levels depending on which
! 10
11
classification you have. So if you had a bachelors it's one
12
level, and a oasters is another level.
13
Q So with your bachelors that gives you a specified
14
level of a certified social worker?
15
A Right.
Q So how many different distinctions are there in the 16
17
certified social workers?
18
A I think there's three.
19
Q Where does the bachelors fit on the scale of
20
things?
21
A Well, I could — I mean, that's the first level.
22
Q To go to a different level would you have to have
23
another degree or what would you have to have?
24
A You have to have a masters degree.
25
Q Do you have any license in Utah?
6|

divisions or anything during that chunk of time?
A The first 10 years I worked for the Division of
Disabilities as a social worker, and I had different jobs
during that time. The first job was I was in an institution.
And I had a case load of about 300 children and adults, and I
was moving them from the institution into — back near their
homes either in — How do you say it — well-cared homes to
more independent homes. So I had a variety of children there
with a variety of handicaps. I did that for 10 years.
And then I went into child protective services, did that
as a worker for two years. And then in that particular job
my supervisor was like 90 miles away and I was in a small
comounity. Pay son, Arizona, which is kind of like up in the
woods. My job was doing adoptions, foster care, foster care
training, child care, child care training, child protective
services. So I did all those, had all the resources for two
years.
And then I went to Bullhead City as a supervisor. I had
six workers. Then when I completed — Before I went to
Phoenix in the Interstate, I had about 12 workers doing
different kinds of jobs; child care, adoptions, child care
training, and foster care training. Then I had C.P.S.
workers go out in the field. So those are kind of the jobs
that I had to give you some —
Q So if I understand it right, you have been in state

CitiCourt, LLC
801.532.3441
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1
area.
employment either with Arizona or Utah your entire career.
2
So as a courtesy among the other states we would do the
A Correct.
3
home
studies as well as the other states would do home
Q Let me ask you a few questions about your current
4
studies for us to make the approvals given for foster care.
job. How does the office work? If Patti Van Wagoner is the
5
They would have to get a license for adoptions or
compact administrator, can you tell me what she does and then
! 6 parent/relative/kinship placement.
tell me what you do?
!
(Mr. Ferre entered.)
7
Q Did you also do post-placement visits?
8
A les.
A Well, I am not certain. She was just hired a
couple months ago, so I don't really know all her job duties.
9
Q When you did a home study in Arizona, did it have
She's the deputy director of children's services. One of her 10
to be signed off by somebody that had a masters degree or
jobs is to supervise my office. I guess if there's any
11
anything like that?
issues I have, I take that to her for some kind of solution.
12
A No.
Basically, my job that I've been doing is that I sake
13
Q About your job here in Utah as compact
approvals on all private adoptions, state adoptions, private
14
administrator, what do you see your role as as the deputy
residential treatment center placements either in the state
15
compact administrator?
or going out, foster care placements, parent/relative
16
A Pardon me? Again?
17
Q What do you see your role as as the deputy compact
placements coming in and out of the state. And so I sake
18
administrator?
sure that all the paperwork for the different compacts is in
19
A Well, I think number one is to review all the cases
order.
20
that come in. And if they are adoptions, if they meet all
Q (By Mr. Jenkins) Is there anyone else in the
21
the criteria I approve those right away. If the case is
office besides you and then, this Patti that's your
22
going out, I make sure all the information is there that
supervisor?
23
meets Utah or other criteria, send those out. And then the
A I just hired Brooklyn Gray, who right now is
24
state cases, I review those to make sure that the cases that
putting all ay records into — well, into the computer
25
we send out have all the information for the other state to
system.
11
9
PAGE 12
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Q
That's the only ones that work in the office?
!
A Right. Well, with Interstate. There's other
i people in the central office, —
Q
Sure.
A
— but that's all the people that work —
Q
Is your position full time?
A Yes.
Q
Who was Patti Van Wagoner?s supervisor?
A
Richard Anderson. Be is the director of the
division.
Q
When you worked in Arizona, it sounded like part of
the time you dealt with adoption down there. What kind of
things did you do with adoption when you were in Arizona?
A
As a social worker?
Q
Correct.
A
I would go out and do hone studies for step-parent
adoptions, and I would go to court to finalize those
adoptions. And then as a supervisor, I had one worker that
did that when I was in Bullhead and then I supervised that.
Q
Before you went into the Arizona I.C.P.C, office,
what experience did you have with interstate compact before
that?
A
Well, as a worker and supervisor I had cases coming
in and going out, state cases for placement in other states
or placement — other states wanting to make it into my
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make a reasonable judgment with the home study they do.
Q Do you kind of view yourself as, I guess — for
lack of a better word, kind of the I.C.P.C, cop, or how do
you —
A I don't think so. I don't see myself as being
that. I see myself as more following state law and just
making sure that in the safety of children that — you know,
that for adoptions that if a child is coming in it meets all
those requirements. In case something happens later, then
nothing will happen to that adoption.
Q Let me ask you what is it that needs to be included
in an I.C.P.C. packet.
A For which type?
Q For a private agency.
A For adoption?
Q For adoption, urn-hum.
A I have a list here that actually was used before I
came. Basically, we want the I.C.P.C. 100A, non-identifying
background information on the mother and the father, medical
release statements from the hospital, relinquishments from
the mother and father 24 hours after the birth. The
father — If the father doesn't have a relinquishment, then
we ask for a statement of risk from the adoptive parents.
And then a home study, which would — adoptive study which
would include the D.C.I, and child abuse and neglect report.
12]
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1

So those are the items that we require to Bake approval.
MR. JENKINS: Okay. I think I probably have the
same thing here you are looking at. Why don't we lark it as
an exhibit and we will see.
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 1 was marked for
identification by the Court Reporter.)
A Okay. This is not the one I use for private
agencies.
Q (By Mr. Jenkins) Let me tell you this was produced
to me by your lawyers so —
A This is the one I use for the state cases.
Q What's different on here than what you use in a
private one?
A In the private adoptions I don't ask whether the
child is Native American or not, and I don't ask for
financial medical plans or subsidy plans unless it's a state
child. Then I ask for that because we have had so many
difficulties with other states and their subsidy plans and
how it all works. And I usually don't ask for the birth
certificate or social security card.
Q Why are those differences made — distinctions made
between private adoptions and state adoptions?
A Generally, I find that the private agencies
licensed by the State on those items — that they should
handle those items, except for the Native American, which for
13
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identification by the Court Reporter.)
Q (By Mr. Jenkins) We were going to talk about ~
Maybe you finished it. Tell me if you did - about why you
have an issue with the financial medical and the adoption
subsidies with the other states.
A We have had a lot of problems with adopting parents
thinking they were going to get sane kind of subsidy from the
state that sent the child. And with this new rule a year
ago, new federal rule, it really breaks it down to — This is
just from my memory, but if a child is S.S.I, eligible and
not in state custody, they can apply with Adoptive Parents
Act for the subsidy. If the child is a ward of the state in
another state, a sending state, then they have to apply
there.
So when the state sends the child, I always want to know
what the subsidy plan is. If the adoption agency is working
with the placement, I figure since they are a licensed
agency, if they have a subsidy, that they should be able to
work that out. Generally, it would come out of the State of
Utah. We just had so many problems with that with other
states. I don't know what it is.
Q Let me ask you on this checklist, this Exhibit 1,
then is that for kids coming into Dtah or is this for kids
going out?
A For-15
PAGE 16
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a long time there was a controversy of whether we should
notify the tribe if a birth mother Native American wants to
give up her child. And the Attorney General's office has
said that that's not an issue for us, so I took that off.
These other items here generally, say the financial
medical plan or adoption subsidy plan, private agencies all
handle that. Most of the times there is no subsidy. And
then the birth certificate and social security card, that's
up to the agencies.
Now, for the state cases, the Native American issue, the
State needs to follow on that because it's a different role
than a private birth mother. Financial medical plans, I
always ask for that and the subsidy just because I have such
an issue with the other states. And the social security
card, birth certificates, they are generally part of the
record,
Q When you say with the financial medical and
adoption subsidy you have an issue with that with other
states, what kinds of things are you talking about? Just if
they bring the child in that it's going to cause some
financial problems for Utah or what?
A Right. There's been some changes last year in
January.
MR. BARLOW: Go off the record.
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 1 was remarked for
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Q Children, you know, being placed in Utah from
another state or kids going from Utah to another state?
A I use the same format, the same — This is the same
format everybody has been using before me.
Q And the purpose of this information is to, what,
make sure that the placement is in the child's best
interests?
A For the safety of the child.
Q Maybe this is a philosophical question, but if you
have an adoption agency that I suppose is charged to protect
the best interests of the child, why do we need this other
layer if it's an agency adoption?
A It's the state law they need to have the approval
from the compact office, which is my office, coming into the
state. And then other states have the same law, so we need
to get the approval from the other state. So they send it
through me, I sign off on it, send it to the other state to
get approval.
Q That's primarily the reason, because the law says
you have to do it?
A The safety of the child, to make sure everything
is Q I am saying, again, if the agency is charged to
protect the interests of the child, why from your standpoint
do we need that? Is it just because the law says we need it?

161

14 J
CitiCourt, LLC
801.532.3441

-*n>\

Alternkwve Options & Services For Children vs> >>Aapman
Michael Ronald Chapman * April 1,2002
SHEET 3

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
;1
.2
3
4
5
.6
7
8
9
0
1
2
3
4
5

PAGE 17

1

A I just think it's a good safety check for the child
1
to sake sure the agency - You know, I get a lot of cases
2
that I have to ask for additional information that the
3
agencies are not getting.
4
Q I am just wondering - Let's say you have a Otah
5
birth mother and a Utah adoptive family. You don't have to
6
provide that; do you, if it's a private agency, Utah birth
7
mother, Utah adoptive family?
8
A It doesn't go through me.
9
Q Who makes sure the agency does what they are
10
111
supposed to do there?
A I guess it would be 19 to the judge, and I guess it 112
would be up to the licensing person in Utah because they
13
review the records.
14
15
Q But wouldn't those same kind of backstops be there
for a placement that goes across state lines, the judge and a 16
17
licensing person?
18
A I don't understand.
Q I guess the question is, you know, why do we even
19
need interstate compact for a private agency adoption if the
20
21
agency is already charged with protecting the best interests
22
of the child?
23
A Well, like I said, some agencies don't provide the
24
information that's required. If we haven't asked for that,
they wouldn't give the information, There might be something 25
17

:
1
1

J

any role in helping her do that?
A Well, if I get a complaint, I forward that on to
licensing from either a parent or from another state agency,
but I don't have any other role than that.
Q Do you ever give advice to Jan?
A Advice how?
Q Say on the applicability of the interstate compact
in a certain situation.
A How it works. I have talked to her about that. I
have talked to the agencies in Utah and other states about
how it works.
Q I understand you have some role in some national
organization now? Is that right?
A I am the president of the Interstate Compact of
Administrators. Last year in Chicago they voted me
president, and then in '03 my term ends. This is the second
time I've been president. I was the president of Arizona
also.
Q What is the title of that organization? What is it
and what does it do?
A Actually — How do I want to say? It has the
interstate and it has directors, associations, and has
just — I think there's about eight or twelve, I am not
certain, agencies like interstate. What they do is they —
the State pays them money every year and they — We have
19
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1
that happens and the adoption would be finalized and then
2
maybe the birth father would have something to go back on and
3
overturn the adoption. I m not saying all agencies do that,
4
but the reason I have some of the holdups in some of these
5
adoptions is because of what is lacking in the referral.
6
Q flow many private agency I.C.P.C. clearances do you
7
do in a year approximately?
8
A I don't b o w exactly. I have about 400 incoming
9
cases a year for all adoptions.
10
Q So that includes state adoptions?
11
A Hi?
12
Q That includes state adoptions?
13
A Yes.
14
Q About how many outgoing cases do you do a year?
A Oh, about 250, something like that, just an average , 15
16
estimated guess.
17
Q
What do you see your role, if any, being vis-a-vis
18
the Office of Licensing and the Department of Human
19
Services? Do you see that you have any role with the Office
20
of Licensing?
21
A
Role how? I don't understand.
22
Q
Well, 1 understand with the Office of Licensing
23
they are to make sure that the agencies are acting in
24
compliance. At least that's what I understood Jan to say
25
this morning. I just wonder. Do you see yourself as having
18

meetings once a year, and we try to resolve problems and
things like that. And it helps us do that. And they are the
ones that made up the compact.
Q As president of that organization, what do you do?
Is there something — some responsibility that you have?
A Well, it's a volunteer position, number one.
Number two, if there's any issues, we have a board also. We
have a president, vice president, treasurer, and then we have
five board members. And then we try to resolve those issues
and then we put it up for a vote at the annual meeting that
we have.
For example, the annual meeting is this April 28th or
29th here in Salt Lake. And we have an agenda, sort of
things that we try to go through. We also have training
classes like on ICWA and other issues like that, and then we
invite private agencies and other people that are interested,
social workers and that kind of thing. So basically those
are the job tasks.
Q How many people typically come to these national
meetings to vote?
A It really depends. This year there's a lot of
budget cutting in the states. I don't know how many will
attend this year. Generally, we have anywhere from say 35 to
45 states attend.
Q Is that one person per state or more than one
20]
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1

person or —
A Well, several states nay send — Like Georgia has
been sending three people, but they only get one vote.
California, who is a massive organization — state and has
interstate broken down into these different ways, they may
send six or seven people. But they only get one vote.
Q Do you find in dealing with all the other states
that all the state compact administrators see things the same
way you do?
A No.
Q How much flexibility do you see is in the compact
itself for doing things differently? You told me how you do
it as far as bringing in information and disseminating
information. What kind of flexibility does a state compact
administrator have?
A I think it's based upon their state laws.
Q Hell, assuming - I guess that the compact is the
same in every state; isn't it?
A Teah, everybody has the same compact law.
Q So if everybody has the same compact law, wouldn't
you hope that the interpretations would be fairly similar?
A Well, I think when you look at adoption — For
example, North Carolina is a good example. Ihey follow their
adoption laws like we follow our adoption laws, and so they
require that these things be set up before they give
21
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A This is the I.C.P.C. 100A form, State of Utah.
Q Tell me what the purpose of this form is.
A This form we use for actually sending cases out.
1
It could be used for private adoptions or state workers use
the same form or residential treatment centers, and sometimes
I get the same form coming in because some of the agencies
send it out to other states where they accept this — they
can use this form or their own form, which is pretty much the
same.
So we use this to get information, and at the bottom we
have where the sending agency signs off the compact, state
signs off, and then the approval at the bottom.
Q Now, does this go with all of the other information
we talked about before?
A Yes. At the front it says Form 100A completed,
signed by the birth parents, guardian, worker.
Q So all this goes together and that comprises an
interstate compact package?
A Right.
Q Have you ever seen a situation where the -- where a
birth mother or birth father signs as the sending agency?
A Sure, that Q That happens?
A Sure.
Q Does it happen a lot?
23
PAGE 24
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approval. So there's a little difference.
And see — I will give you an example of Nevada. They
require, for example, a state social worker go out and visit
and sign off where we don't require that. We have a licensed
agency and, you know, that's good enough for us because they
are licensed by the State of Utah. So there's little
differences. Some require birth mothers to give summaries,
what they did, that kind of thing.
Q Are there some that actually preclude a birth
mother from going to another state with the child?
A Pardon me?
Q Are there some that actually may keep a birth
mother from traveling to another state?
A I don't know how they could do that.
Q Sell, by not giving approval.
A I don't understand.
Q Maybe we can get into it later as we work through
things.
Tell me how — You walked through and told me the kinds
of things that you typically get.
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 2 was marked for
identification by the Court Reporter.)
Q (By Mr. Jenkins) I have handed you Exhibit 2 to
your deposition. Maybe this will make the package a little
more complete. Can you tell me what this is?
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A Yeah.
Q Have you had any particular concerns about that at
all in your experience with interstate compact?
A No.
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 3 was marked for
identification by the Court Reporter.)
Q (By Mr. Jenkins) Let me represent to you what this
is. I pulled this off the Department of Human Services' Web
page, I believe, either that or else off the State of Utah's
Web page. It's just the interstate compact, an easy-to-read
version. It was either that or copy it out of my itty-bitty
statutes.
Let me ask you a few questions about the compact itself
and your understanding. Is it your understanding that the
sending state also has to give approval for an interstate
placement or just the receiving state?
A Well, I don't know about approval. They have to
sign off on it as the sending state.
Q So if the sending state doesn't sign on the form,
then as the receiving state you won't take it?
A Not if it's not a compact, right. Say it again.
Q If you get - Say you get a 100A with all the stuff
but there's no signature on the sending state line. Would
you take it? What do you call that when the sending state
signs on the line? Is that not approval?
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

Third Judicial District
,
/~17V V
COUNT

ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS AND
SERVICES FOR CHILDREN, et.
al.,

Clen

MINUTE ENTRY
Plaintiffs,
CASE NO. 020905025
vs.
JUDGE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD
MICHAEL CHAPMAN, et. al.
Defendants.

The Court has before it requests for decision in connection
with the following motions: (1) Defendants' Michael Chapman, Robin
Arnold Williams, Janice P. Knaphus and the Utah Department of Human
Services

( "Defendants A") Motion To Dismiss;

(2) Plaintiffs'

Motion For Partial Summary Judgment; and (3) Defendants' Michael
Chapman,

Dennis

Eshman, Association

Of Administrators

Of The

Interstate Compact on the Placement Of Children and The American
Public

Human

Dismiss.

Services

Association

("Defendants B") Motion

To

Oral arguments were heard on January 21, 2003 after which

the Court took the matter under advisement.
Defendants A contend that plaintiff's complaint against them
should be dismissed because: 1) plaintiffs lack standing; and 2)
the Court lacks jurisdiction.

Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue

that they do have standing as advocates for expectant mothers and
that this Court has jurisdiction to settle the controversy under
Utah's Declaratory Judgment Act1.

Plaintiffs request that the Court-Convert^ ^defendants •
Motion To Dismiss into a Motion For Summ^iy^iSr&dgment based upon

^^rq

ALTERNATE OPTIONS &
SERVICES FOR CHILDREN
ET. AL. V. CHAPMAN ET.
AL.

PAGE 2

MINUTE ENTRY

In order to have standing a party must assert its own legal
rights and interests and may not attempt to claim the legal rights
and interest of third parties.

Shelledy v Lore 836 P.2d 786, 789

(Utah

v

1992)

(citing,

Warth

(1975)(citations omitted).

Seldin,

422

U.S.

490,

499

In this case, plaintiffs lack standing

because they fail to request relief for an alleged violation of
their own constitutional rights.

Instead, plaintiffs predicate

their entire allegations on the alleged violation of the rights of
non-party expectant mothers.
Parties such as plaintiff may, under certain circumstances,
have standing to assert the rights of a third party.

In order to

do so the claimant party must show: "first, the presence of some
substantial

relationship

between

the

claimant

and

the

third

parties; second the impossibility of the right holders asserting
their own constitutional rights; and third, the need to avoid a
dilution of third parties1 constitutional rights" Shelledy at 789
(citing, Note, Standing To Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88
Harv. L. Rev. 423, 425 (1975)).
After applying the third party standing factors to the parties
in this case, the Court concludes that plaintiffs lack the ability
the submission of exhibits outside the context of the pleading.
Upon consideration, the Court concludes that the attached matters
are relied upon in the pleadings and accordingly the motion shall
remain a Motion To Dismiss. URCP 12(b).

ALTERNATE OPTIONS &
SERVICES FOR CHILDREN
ET. AL. V. CHAPMAN ET.
AL.
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to assert the third party rights of expectant mothers.

The Court

finds that plaintiffs relationship with the third party expectant
mothers is not "substantial", the third party mothers are capable
of asserting their own constitutional

rights, and there is no

evidence that failure to permit third party standing will somehow
dilute the expectant mothers' constitutional rights.
For these reasons the Court concludes that plaintiffs lack
standing to bring claims on behalf of non-party expectant mothers.
This conclusion is inextricably linked with defendants' arguments
on declaratory action and therefore obviates the need to address
those issues further.

By granting defendants A's Motion To Dismiss

I implicitly deny plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
and

grant Defendants B's Motion To Dismiss.
Defendants A's counsel to prepare and Order consistent with

this Minute Entry and submit it to the Court for final review and
signature.
Dated this

day of January, 2 002.

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 020905025 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Mail

Dated this

NAME
PAUL C FARR
ATTORNEY DEF
99 NORTH MAIN
P.O.ST OFFICE BOX 364
LOGAN, UT 84321
JOEL A FERRE
ATTORNEY DEF
160 EAST 300 SOUTH, 5TH
FLOOR
P.O. BOX 140857
SALT LAKE CITY UT
84114-0857
LARRY S JENKINS
ATTORNEY PLA
60 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE
SUITE 500
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111

22.

day

Paqe 1 (last)

z&

FltED Br?SiGT COURT
Third Jt jjcial District

CRAIG L. BARLOW (#0213)
JOELA.FERRE(#7517)
Assistant Attorneys General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (#4666)
Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendants
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
P.O. Box 140857
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857
Telephone: (801)366-0353

"•PutyCtortt

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS AND SERVICES
FOR CHILDREN, et at,

ORDER

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. 020905025

MICHAEL CHAPMAN, et al,

Judge Stephen L. Henriod

Defendants.

The Court has before it Defendants' Michael Chapman, Robin Arnold-Williams, Janice
P. Knaphus and the Utah Department of Human Services (the "State defendants") Motion to
Dismiss; Defendants' Michael Chapman, Dennis Eschman, Association of Administrators of the
Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children and the American Public Human Services
Association (the "Association defendants") Motion to Dismiss; and Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment. Oral arguments were heard on January 21, 2003.

-\u\

BACKGROUND
1.

The Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children (the "ICPC") is a uniform

law that has been enacted by all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the United States Virgin
Islands.
2.

Utah has adopted the ICPC, which is codified at Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-701 et

3.

Article VII of the ICPC requires each state which is a party to the ICPC to appoint

seq.

an officer "who shall be general coordinator of activities under this compact in his jurisdiction ..
.." Defendant Michael Chapman is the Deputy Compact Administrator for the State of Utah.
4.

In Utah, the Compact Administrator's office is located within the Division of

Child and Family Services ("DCFS"), which is a division of defendant Department of Human
Services (the "Department"). The Department, through the DCFS, is responsible for accepting
and reviewing information submitted in connection with adoptive placements subject to the
ICPC.
5.

Defendant Robin Arnold-Williams is the Executive Director of the Department.

6.

Defendant Janice P. Knaphus is a licensing specialist in the Office of Licensing of

the Department with oversight responsibilities for adoption agencies.
7.

Defendant Association of Administrators of the ICPC ("AAICPC") is a private

organization based in Washington D.C. Its members consist of the Compact Administrators (or

2

other in this position with different titles) for each state. Defendant Chapman is the president of
the AAICPC for the term 2001 through 2003.
8.

Defendant American Public Human Services Association (the "APHSA") is a

nonprofit corporation based in Washington D.C. The APHSA provides secretarial
(administrative) services to the AAICPC and also provides similar services to other related
organizations.
9.

Defendant Dennis Eshman is an employee of the APHSA and provides secretariat

services for the AAICPC.
10.

Plaintiffs are child-placing agencies licensed by the State of Utah.

11.

On December 3, 2002, the State defendants notified each of the plaintiffs that it

would utilize AAICPC Opinion #49 as guidance on regulatory and licensing actions concerning
child placing agencies.
12.

Opinion #49, issued by the AAICPC on June 30, 1986, expresses the AAICPC's

opinion regarding the application of the ICPC to a situation where a mother crosses state lines to
deliver a child and place it for adoption in that state.
13.

The State defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint on July 1, 2002. The

State defendants argue that plaintiffs lack standing and that the Court lacks jurisdiction over
plaintiffs' claims.

3

14.

The Association defendants moved to join the State defendants' Motion to

Dismiss and separately moved to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint on October 17,2002. The
Association defendants argue that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against the Association
defendants.
15.

Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on October 16, 2002. Plaintiffs

argued that the Opinion #49 is an incorrect interpretation of the ICPC. In response to defendants'
motions, plaintiffs contend that they do have standing as advocates for expectant mothers and
that the Court has jurisdiction to settle the controversy under Utah Declaratory Judgment Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiffs request that the Court convert the State defendants' Motion to Dismiss

into a Motion for Summary Judgment based upon the submission of exhibits outside the context
of the pleading. Upon consideration, the Court concludes that the attached matters are relied
upon in the pleadings and accordingly the motion remains a Motion to Dismiss. Utah R.Civ.P.
12(b).
2.

In order to have standing a party must assert its own legal rights and interests and

may not attempt to claim the legal rights and interests of third parties. Shelledv v. Lore. 836 P.2d
786, 789 (Utah 1992) (citing Warth v. Seldin. 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)).

4

3.

In this case, plaintiffs lack standing because they fail to request relief for an

alleged violation of their own constitutional rights. Instead, plaintiffs predicate their entire
allegations on the alleged violation of the rights of non-party expectant mothers.
4.

Plaintiffs may, under certain circumstances, have standing to assert the rights of a

third party. In order to do so, plaintiffs must show: "first, the presence of some substantial
relationship between the claimant and the third parties; second the impossibility of the right
holders asserting their own constitutional rights; and third, the need to avoid a dilution of third
parties' constitutional rights;' Shelledv. 836 P.2d at 789.
5.

Plaintiffs lack the ability to assert third party rights of expectant mothers because

plaintiffs' relationship with third party expectant mothers is not "substantial," the third party
mothers are capable of asserting their own constitutional rights, and there is nothing to indicate
that failure to permit third party standing will somehow dilute the expectant mothers'
constitutional rights. This conclusion is inextricably linked with defendants' arguments on
declaratory judgment.
Given the foregoing, the Court enters the following Order:
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

That the State defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED;

2.

That the Association defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED;

5

3ln

3.

That plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED; and

4.

That plaintiffs' complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice.

DATED this % day of February, 2003.
BY THE COURT:

STEPHEN L. HENRHJH* f
District Court Judge - " '
Approved^ 4 ^ - ^ ^ .

Counsel for AssociatioirlJefl

6
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was served this
c&

day of February, 2003, on:

Larry S. Jenkins
G. Troy Parkinson
Wood Crapo, LLC
500 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Michael W. Homer
Paul C. Farr
Suitter Axland
175 S. West Temple, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480

Secretary

3fet

WOOD CRAPO LLC
Larry S. Jenkins #4854
Richard J. Armstrong #7461
500 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 366-6060

FEB
ay,

' 8 2003

SALT I

°eputy Clerk

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS AND SERVICES FOR
CHILDREN, a Utah non-profit corporation, dba
ACT OF LOVE, ADOPTION CENTER OF
CHOICE, INC., a Utah corporation, and A TLC
ADOPTION, a Utah corporation,
Plaintiffs,

MICHAEL CHAPMAN, in his official capacity as
Deputy Compact Administrator of the Interstate
Compact on Placement of Children and in his
official capacity as President of the Association of
Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the
Placement of Children; ROBIN ARNOLDWILLIAMS, in her official capacity as Executive
Director of the Utah Department of Human
Services; JANICE P. KNAPHUS, in her official
capacity as Licensing Specialist in the Office of
Licensing of the Utah Department of Human
Services; the UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN
SERVICES, a governmental department of the
State of Utah; DENNIS ESHMAN, in his official
capacity as Manager of the Secretariat Staff of the
Association of Administrators of the Interstate
Compact on the Placement of Children, the
ASSOCIATION OF ADMINISTRATORS OF THE
INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE
PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN, and the
AMERICAN PUBLIC HUMAN SERVICES
ASSOCIATION, in its capacity as Secretariat of the
Association of Administrators of the Interstate
Compact on the Placement of Children,
Defendants.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Civil No. 020905025

Judge Stephen L. Henriod

Plaintiffs Alternative Options and Services for Children, a Utah non-profit
corporation, dba Act of Love, and Adoption Center of Choice, Inc., a Utah corporation, provide
notice pursuant to Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure that they appeal the
Order of this Count signed and entered on or about February 25, 2003, to the Utah Supreme
Court. The February 25, 2003 Order granted defendants' motions to dismiss and also dismissed
this action without prejudice.
DATED this ^ £ day of February, 2003
WOOD CRAPO LLC

Larry S.vjenki
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on t h c ^ d a y of February, 2003, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL was mailed in the U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to:
Craig L. Barlow, Esq.
Joel A. Ferre, Esq.
Utah Attorney General's Office
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
P.O. Box 140857
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0857
Attorneys for Utah Defendants
Michael W. Homer
Paul C. Farr
Suitter Axland
175 South West Temple, Suite 700
P.O. Box 45101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Attorneys for Association Defendants
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